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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the increasingly global nature of the networks to which 
lawyer regulation stakeholders belong. After identifying who lawyer regulation 
stakeholders are, the Article identifies five different kinds of opportunities these 
stakeholders have to interact with global counterparts or to be exposed to 
global perspectives. For each of the five identified opportunities, the Article 
provides several examples that illustrate the ways in which U.S. lawyer regula-
tion stakeholders are connected to global networks. The Article explains the 
broad impact that these kinds of networks can have and concludes that global 
networks, and the perspectives they bring, should now be viewed as a regular 
part of U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholder conversations.  
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INTRODUCTION: LAWYER REGULATION STAKEHOLDERS PARTICIPATE 
IN GLOBAL NETWORKS 
This Article is written for the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics’ (“GJLE”) 
2020 Symposium about the regulation and self-regulation of attorneys in the 
United States and internationally. Rather than addressing a specific regulation 
topic, such as the “competencies” lawyers need in order to practice law, this 
Article focuses on a “process” question related to how lawyer regulation change 
occurs. This Article suggests that, as a result of global networks of lawyer regula-
tion stakeholders, it has become increasingly rare for U.S. lawyer regulation con-
versations to be exclusively domestic. Global networks have affected the 
vocabulary, content, and participants involved in U.S. lawyer regulation conver-
sations. Thus, when approaching a lawyer regulation topic, such as the topics 
covered in the GJLE Symposium, one should expect the conversation to include 
perspectives influenced by developments and individuals outside the United 
States. 
Although prior articles have referred to global networks of lawyer regulation 
stakeholders,1 this is the first article I am aware of that has as its central focus 
these global networks and the role they play in the diffusion of knowledge. This 
Article does not purport to offer a scientific study of these global networks. 
Indeed, it could not do so because the study of networks is a sophisticated “inter-
disciplinary field that combines ideas from mathematics, physics, biology, com-
puter science, statistics, the social sciences, and many other areas.”2 Nor does this 
Article provide an expert application of diffusion theory.3 Despite these limita-
tions, the information and examples in this Article will help explain why, when 
1. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin et al., The Impact of International Lawyer Organizations on Lawyer 
Regulation, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 407 (2018); Laurel S. Terry, Global Networks and the Legal Profession, 53 
AKRON L. REV. 137 (2019) (discussing legal profession networks in general) [hereinafter Global Networks]; 
Laurel S. Terry, The Impact of Global Developments on U.S. Legal Ethics During the Past Thirty Years, 30 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 381–86 (2017) (briefly discussing global lawyer regulation stakeholder networks) 
[hereinafter Thirty Years]. See generally Laurel S. Terry & Carole Silver, Transnational Legal Practice, 49 
INT’L LAW. 413, 413–14 (2015) (articulating a TLP-Nets [transnational legal practice networks] framework to 
discuss 2014 transnational legal practice year-in-review developments). 
2. See, e.g., MARK NEWMAN, NETWORKS ix (2d ed. 2018) [hereinafter NEWMAN, NETWORKS]. Network sci-
ence has been applied to networks as diverse as social, technology, information, and biologic networks. Id. at 
14–103. 
3. Cf. William D. Henderson, Innovation Diffusion in the Legal Industry, 122 DICK. L. REV. 395 (2018). 
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analyzing U.S. lawyer regulation and legal services issues, it is important for law-
yer regulation stakeholders to be aware of global networks and the global conver-
sations and global developments they introduce into the analysis of these issues. 
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I identifies and categorizes 
U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders. Part II identifies five ways in which U.S. 
stakeholders are exposed to global perspectives and connected to global net-
works. Part III explains the concept of diffusion and its impact on lawyer regula-
tion stakeholder networks. The final Part offers concluding observations about 
the global nature of lawyer regulation stakeholder networks. 
I. IDENTIFYING LAWYER REGULATION STAKEHOLDERS 
Before examining the opportunities to participate in global networks available 
to U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders, it is appropriate to begin by identifying 
those stakeholders to whom this Article refers. Some of the obvious stakeholders 
include clients, lawyers, and the entities that traditionally regulate lawyers.4 To 
identify entities that traditionally regulate lawyers, it is useful to ask who regu-
lates the entry stage of the profession, who regulates the conduct stage of the pro-
fession, and who regulates lawyer discipline.5 In other words, it is useful to 
distinguish among the beginning, middle, and end stages of regulation.6 It is also 
helpful to distinguish among the traditional regulators that have overarching 
responsibility for regulation and the traditional regulators who are responsible for 
the “front-line” or day-to-day regulation of lawyers.7 
Id. at 756. It should be noted, however, that “overarching authority” does not necessarily mean that the 
Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to regulate lawyers. State supreme court regulation of lawyers is sub-
ject to additional federal laws. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (finding unconsti-
tutional an advertising ethics rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Arizona). With respect to certain issues of 
lawyer regulation, there may be differing viewpoints about the location of the line between the U.S. 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and its Tenth Amendment reservation of power to the states. See generally 
Stephen P. Mulligan, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 18–19 (Cong. 
Research Serv. RL32528, Updated Sept. 19, 2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32528 
[https://perma.cc/X932-EPKT]; Marc I. Steinberg & John M. Koneck, Federalism, the Tenth Amendment, and 
the Legal Profession: The Power of a Federal Judge to Restrain a Convicted Attorney, as a Condition of 
Probation, from Practicing in the State Courts, 56 NEB. L. REV. 783 (1977). 
(The term “front-line regu-
lator” has become more common in the United States following the adoption of 
the 2007 U.K. Legal Services Act and the use of this term to describe U.K. 
regulators.8
Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, §§ 2, 20, sch. 1–2 (Eng., Wales), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2007/29/ [https://perma.cc/7V6H-962Z] (establishing the Legal Services Board and creating the system for 
) 
4. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl cmt. 9 (2018) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (indirectly 
identifying stakeholders when observing that “[v]irtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict 
between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining 
an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living”). 
5. Laurel S. Terry, The Power of Lawyer Regulators to Increase Client & Public Protection Through 
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approving front-line regulators); Approved Regulators, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD https://www.legal 
servicesboard.org.uk/about-us/approved-regulators [https://perma.cc/ZHQ9-XVG6] (last visited May 20, 
2020) (listing the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”) as the independent regulatory body for solicitors 
and the Bar Standards Board (“BSB”) as the independent regulatory body for barristers (in England and 
Wales). The author has personal knowledge that U.K. and U.S. speakers often refer to the SRA and BSB as 
“front-line” regulators. 
In the United States, each jurisdiction’s highest court (which will be referred to 
for the sake of simplicity as the state supreme court) typically is the regulatory 
body that has the overarching responsibility for lawyer regulation.9 
See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 2019, chart 1, http:// 
www.ncbex.org/assets/BarAdmissionGuide/NCBE-CompGuide-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CSW-YJUG] 
(listing for all jurisdictions the state supreme court as the authority that promulgates the rules for admission); AM. 
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201A: REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mjp_migrated/201a. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3WQ-455S] (reaffirming the ABA’s “support for the principle of state judicial 
regulation of the practice of law” and providing in the accompanying report citations and supporting 
information) [hereinafter ABA Resolution 201A]. 
Its regulatory 
authority applies to the beginning, middle, and end stages of lawyer regulation.10 
Front-line regulatory responsibility, on the other hand, varies from state to state. 
For example, in some states, especially those with a unified state bar, the state 
supreme court may have delegated to the same entity the initial responsibility for 
handling the administration of the supreme court’s lawyer admissions authority 
and its discipline authority.11 
See, e.g., OREGON STATE BAR, https://www.osbar.org [https://perma.cc/UFQ3-QTNF] (last visited May 
20, 2020) (listing both admissions and lawyer discipline under the “Licensing/Compliance” top menu item of 
this unified state bar). 
In other states, however, the state supreme court has 
delegated to different entities within that state the front-line responsibility for 
admissions issues on the one hand, and discipline issues on the other hand.12 
Although lawyer regulation stakeholders clearly include clients, lawyers, and 
the traditional regulators, the list of lawyer regulation stakeholders is much 
broader. Professor David Wilkins’ groundbreaking article entitled, Who Should 
Regulate Lawyers?, as well as his follow-up article, helped us better understand 
potential stakeholders.13 After identifying the potential stakeholders, his articles 
9. 
10. See Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 721. 
11. 
12. See Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 721 & n.9 (citing Pennsylvania as an example, which 
has the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners, which handles admissions issues and the Pennsylvania Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel, which handles discipline issues; both of these bodies have been delegated their author-
ity by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and neither is part of a regulatory unified state bar); see also id. at 754– 
55, app. 5 (summarizing ABA data regarding the functions of the state bar in those states that have a unified 
state bar). 
13. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 804–09 (1992); David B. 
Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?—Managing Conflict and Context in 
Professional Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 465 (1996) [hereinafter Follow-up Regulation Article] 
(responding to Fordham Symposium authors who discussed his original article). The groundbreaking nature of 
the original article is demonstrated by the fact that although it was written more than twenty-five years ago, it 
continues to be cited. See, e.g., Michael Moffitt, Settlement Malpractice, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1825, 1837 n.25, 
1891–92, 1892 n.244 (2019); Elizabeth Chambliss, Evidence-Based Regulation, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 305 
n.51 (2019). 
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evaluated the comparative strengths of disciplinary, liability, institutional, and 
legislative controls for lawyer enforcement systems.14 Later articles have pro-
vided additional insights about stakeholders interested in lawyer regulation 
issues.15 Recent articles and policy papers remind us that individuals who are not 
receiving legal services are also stakeholders in the lawyer regulatory system.16 
See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to Promote Access, 
Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (2016); Rebecca L Sandefur, What We Know 
and Need to Know about the Legal Needs of the Public, 67 S.C. L. REV. 443 (2016); LEGAL SERVICES 
CORPORATION, THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 
(2017), available at https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U4JC-BT3M].
There undoubtedly are many different ways in which one might classify lawyer 
regulation stakeholders, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine and 
apply stakeholder theories developed in other contexts.17 
See, e.g., Bobby Parmar et al., Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art, 4 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 403– 
45 (2010) (summarizing stakeholder theory in a corporate setting); Andrew Crane & Trish Ruebottom, 
Stakeholder Theory and Social Identity: Rethinking Stakeholder Identification, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 77 (Mar. 
2011); Erika Rizzoa, Brownfield Regeneration in Europe: Identifying Stakeholder Perceptions, Concerns, 
Attitudes and Information Needs, 48 LAND USE POL’Y 437, 438 (2015) (citing Reed’s definition of stakeholders 
as “any organisation, group or person who takes an interest in a project, or those who have the ability to influ-
ence its outcomes”). 
From a network perspective, stakeholders might be thought of as the “nodes” or points that are connected to 
one another. See NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 1 (“A network is, in its simplest form, a collection of 
points joined together in pairs by lines. In the nomenclature of the field a point is referred to as a node . . . think-
ing of [systems] in this way can lead to new and useful insights.”). Network scientists have developed sophisti-
cated theories that help them determine how many different communities there are within a network. See, e.g., 
M. E. J. NEWMAN & GESINE REINERT, ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES IN A NETWORK (Phys. Rev. 
Lett. Ser. No. 117.078301, Aug. 23, 2016), available at https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Estimating- 
the-number-of-communities-in-a-network-Newman-Reinert/81bf82198d038a6c46fa2ff94e6de276b3f39b8a 
[https://perma.cc/Y42E-7KXM]. The abstract explains that: 
Community detection, the division of a network into dense subnetworks with only sparse connec-
tions between them, has been a topic of vigorous study in recent years. However, while there exist 
a range of powerful and flexible methods for dividing a network into a specified number of com-
munities, it is an open question how to determine exactly how many communities one should use. 
Here we describe a mathematically principled approach for finding the number of communities in 
a network using a maximum-likelihood method. We demonstrate the approach on a range of real- 
world examples with known community structure, finding that it is able to determine the number 
of communities correctly in every case. 
This Article defines the 
14. Wilkins, Follow-up Regulation Article, supra note 13, at 467. 
15. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2009) (identify-
ing examples of lawyer regulation in the course of discussing why references to “self-regulation” are inaccu-
rate); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994); John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics 
Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009) (providing examples of lawyer regulation that go well-beyond 
the traditional judicial state regulation of lawyers); Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal 
Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” J. PROF. LAW. 189, 205–06 
(2008) [hereinafter Service Providers] (identifying examples of soft law regulation of lawyers); Anthony E. 
Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 211 (1996); 
Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer Regulation: Response to Davis, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 233–34 (1996); Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of 
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 267 (1995). 
Despite this literature about lawyer regulation stakeholders, when researching this Article, I was unable to 
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term “stakeholders” broadly and includes within its definition groups and individ-
uals who take an interest in, are affected by, or have the ability to influence law-
yer regulation. In other words, the stakeholders listed in Table 1, infra, include 
those who are interested in the outcome of lawyer regulation issues, in addition to 
those for whose benefit lawyer regulation provisions are enacted. 
Some of the stakeholders in Table 1 are described generically (e.g., clients), 
whereas others are identified by name, such as the Conference of Chief Justices.18 
The stakeholders in Table 1 have different levels of control: some of the stake-
holders exercise what might be called “hard law” power whereas others exercise 
indirect or “soft law” power and still others have little or no power but are 
affected by the lawyer regulatory system.19 This Article groups these stakeholders 
into the following ten categories:20  
1) Those on whose behalf regulations are adopted;  
2) Traditional U.S. lawyer regulators;  
3) Groups that represent, and are primarily comprised of, traditional U.S. 
lawyer regulators;  
4) Groups that purport to offer expert balanced advice to traditional U.S. 
lawyer regulators;  
5) Other U.S. regulators whose actions directly affect lawyer regulation;  
6) Those who do not have “hard law” regulatory authority over lawyers, but 
interact with lawyers and may be able to enforce regulatory-like rules or 
compliance;  
7) Those who are directly affected by lawyer regulation provisions (but are 
not the population for whose benefit lawyer regulations are adopted):  
8) Additional individuals or entities within the United States that may be 
affected by, or care about, U.S. lawyer regulation issues; 
Id. at 1. The goals of this Article are modest—it seeks to identify categories of lawyer regulation stakeholders who 
operate as “nodes” within a network and to identify opportunities available to these stakeholders—i.e., “nodes”— 
that connect them to stakeholders in other countries, i.e., the opportunities that act as lines (or “edges”). 
18. See infra note 29 and accompanying text, which lists the Conference of Chief Justices (“CCJ”), the 
National Conference of Bar Examiners (“NCBE”), and the National Organization of Bar Counsel (“NOBC”) as 
examples of groups that represent, and are primarily comprised of, traditional U.S. lawyer regulators. See also 
Wilkins, Follow-up Regulation Article, supra note 13, at 479–82 (explaining the tradeoffs between a categori-
cal approach to examining regulatory advantages and a case-by-case approach and responding to comments 
and critiques). 
19. For a discussion of hard and soft law, see Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 487, 490 (2015) [hereinafter US Legal 
Profession AML Efforts]. Although many of the “hard-law” and “soft-law” stakeholders easily fit within 
Professor Wilkins’ categories, some are more difficult to classify. See also Wilkins, Follow-up Regulation 
Article, supra note 13, at 477 (noting that his categories did not fully capture the kind of modified self-regula-
tion described by Professor Rory Little that involved U.S. Attorney General efforts to control federal 
prosecutors). 
20. Although many of the listed stakeholders might fit in multiple categories, I have chosen to list each 
stakeholder once and only once. For an explanation of these categories and examples of stakeholders in each 
category, see infra at notes 25–50 and accompanying text. 
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9) Foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, and interna-
tional dispute resolution bodies that have adopted policies or rules that 
may directly or indirectly affect U.S. lawyer regulation; and  
10) Additional individuals or entities outside the United States that may be 
affected by, or care about, U.S. lawyer regulation. 
This Article does not claim that Table 1 is the only way in which one might clas-
sify lawyer regulation stakeholders.21 Some commentators undoubtedly would cre-
ate a different set of categories or place some stakeholders in different categories 
than those found in Table 1. In addition, our society’s view of “stakeholders” may 
evolve over time, as has happened in the business context which now includes 
increased discussion of external stakeholders and interests.22 
See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State: 
Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001 (2016) (discussing, inter 
alia, the United Nations’ 2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights); U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS 
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13, (U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/11/04, 2011), available at https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_ 
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KWV-LD2A]; John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of 
Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 545 (2016) (analyzing impact of hedge fund 
share ownership); ANDREW JOHNSON ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY STATEMENT (Jan. 
2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3502101 [https://perma.cc/WT88-HLL2? 
type=image]; PBS, World’s Largest Asset Manager Says It Will Focus On Climate Change (Jan. 14, 2020), https:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/worlds-largest-asset-manager-says-it-will-focus-on-climate-change [https:// 
perma.cc/6873-EPMA]; COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES EUROPE, PRACTICAL ISSUES FOR BARS AND 
LAW SOCIETIES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY GUIDANCE III (May 2017), available at https://www. 
ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/CSR/CSR_Guides___recommendations/EN_CSR_ 
20170519_Guidance-III.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8BU-KYW4]; Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social 
Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37 Definitions, 15 CORP. SOC. RESPONSIB. ENVIRON. MGMT. 1, 1 
(2008); Parmar et al., supra note 17. 
Some might decide 
that it is better not to define the term “stakeholder,” which is the approach taken in 
the 2012 Recommendations Regarding Regulation Policy and Governance adopted 
by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).23 
ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT (OECD), RECOMMENDATION OF THE 
COUNCIL ON REGULATORY POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 8 (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/ 
regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf [https://perma.cc/92QD-Z36V] (referring to governments’ obligations 
regarding stakeholders without defining the term). For example, paragraph 2.2 in the Annex to this 
recommendation states that “[g]overnments should co-operate with stakeholders on reviewing existing and 
developing new regulations,” but it does not explain how governments should identify or define the relevant 
stakeholders. Id. For background information about the OECD’s regulatory reform initiative, see Regulatory 
Policy, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/ [https://perma.cc/5JBX-5VBK] (last visited May 
20, 2020); Recommendations and Guidelines on Regulatory Policy, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gov/ 
regulatory-policy/recommendations-guidelines.htm [https://perma.cc/SVR8-596C] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
For background about the OECD, which is an international organization whose “member countries work with 
partners and organizations worldwide to address the pressing policy challenges of our time,” see About, OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/E3DE-YTEH] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
But 
21. This Article represents my first effort to identify lawyer regulation stakeholders. As stated in note 15, su-
pra, my research failed to locate a comprehensive list of these stakeholders. I am grateful to Professor Leslie 
Levin for thoughtful comments that helped me refine my thinking and my communication about the stakeholder 
categories I identified. I hope this Article prompts further discussion of stakeholder categories; I recognize that 
as a result of such discussions, my understanding of stakeholder categories may change and evolve. 
22. 
23. 
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since the focus of this Article is on the ways in which lawyer regulation stakeholders 
connect to global networks and the diffusion of these global perspectives, it seemed 
appropriate for this Article to explicitly identify lawyer regulation stakeholders. 
Table 1, which appears below, identifies ten categories of U.S. lawyer regulation 
stakeholders and provides illustrative examples under each category: 
Table 1: U.S. Lawyer Regulation Stakeholders24 
Stakeholder Group 1: Those on whose behalf regulations are adopted:25  
Stakeholder Group 1 is intended to correspond to the “objects” of a jurisdiction’s explicit or implicit reg-
ulatory objectives—i.e., those on whose behalf its lawyer regulations are adopted See generally Laurel S. Terry 
et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2012); (recom-
mending the adoption of regulatory objectives and identifying the authors’ views of those on behalf they should 
be adopted); Laurel S. Terry, Why Your Jurisdiction Should Consider Jumping On The Regulatory Objectives 
Bandwagon, 22 J. PROF. L. 28, 29 (2013), available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/ 
Terry_Regulatory_Objectives_Bandwagon_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZZL-5SP5] [hereinafter Regulatory 
Bandwagon] (arguing that jurisdictions should explicitly identify their regulatory objectives; doing so may 
reduce the chance of capture and may increase the chance that regulators consider all appropriate regulatory 
objectives, rather than focusing exclusively on a single objective, such as client protection, to the exclusion of 
other appropriate objectives, such as access to legal services); ABA Resolution 105: ABA Model Regulatory 
Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services (adopted Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.abajournal.com/files/ 
2016_hod_midyear_105.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKM2-CH3K]; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl. 
� those who use legal services, whom this Article refers to as “clients;”  
� individuals who have a legal need, but are not currently using legal 
services;  
� the public (which may be affected by the manner in which a lawyer delivers 
legal services to a client); and 
� the individuals who oppose a lawyer’s client (in litigation) or who are deal-
ing with a lawyer’s client (in a transactional matter). 
Stakeholder Group 2: Traditional U.S. lawyer regulators:26  
� each state’s highest court [hereinafter “supreme court”], which in the 
United States is the traditional overarching regulator; 
24. I have not provided a footnote for each stakeholder listed. Some stakeholders, such as “clients,” do not 
easily lend themselves to a footnote; others, such as the National Conference of Bar Examiners, are easily 
located with an Internet search. I have included a footnote at the beginning of each category. See also supra 
note 20 (explaining that each illustrative stakeholder is listed in one and only one of the ten categories). 
25. 
26. Stakeholder Group 2 consists of the actors or entities who traditionally regulate lawyers. See generally 
ABA Resolution 201A, supra note 9 (“RESOLVED, that the [ABA] affirms its support for the principle of state 
judicial regulation of the practice of law”); Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 77, 98 (summarizing 
in Appendix 5 ABA data identifying unified state bars and the responsibilities they have assumed). 
Because judges and courts adopt local rules that regulate the lawyers who appear before them, I have 
included them in Group 2. One might argue that they also belong in Group 1, as entities for whose benefit law-
yer regulation provisions are adopted. But as explained supra note 20, Table 1 lists each stakeholder only once, 
even though that stakeholder might fit in multiple categories. To use a grammar analogy, I see Group 1 as the 
objects of regulation and Group 2 as the subjects imposing regulation and believe that courts and judges are 
more properly included with other traditional regulators, rather than with the beneficiaries or objects of lawyer 
regulation. 
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� the state regulators to whom the state supreme courts have delegated 
authority—in other words, the “day job” regulators or “front-line” 
regulators;  
� judges and courts before whom a lawyer may appear;  
� regulatory bar associations (which in the United States are often called 
“unified bar associations”) when acting in their regulatory, rather than rep-
resentational capacity;27 
See generally In re Rule to Create Vol. State Bar Ass’n of. Neb., 841 N.W.2d 167, 169, 172–73 (Neb. 
2013) (denying petition to convert the Nebraska Bar Association to a voluntary bar, referring to “unified” state 
bars, and describing their powers and limits). For additional information about state unified bar associations 
and their functions, see Appendix 5 in Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 98; Bar Structure Work 
Group, WASHINGTON STATE BAR, https://www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/Committees-Boards-and-Other- 
Groups/bar-structure-work-group [https://perma.cc/M4GU-UHD7] (last visited May 20, 2020) (providing links 
to meeting materials and other resources as the Washington State Bar considered the proper scope of its 
activities as a unified bar association); Leslie C. Levin, The End of Mandatory State Bars?, 109 GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE 1 (2020), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/26/ 
2020/04/Levin_The-End-of-Mandatory-State-Bars.pdf  [https://perma.cc/R6YS-EM7Q].
and  
� official accrediting agencies to whom power has been delegated, such as 
the Council of the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar.28 
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, THE LAW SCHOOL 
ACCREDITATION PROCESS 3 (Rev’d Sept. 2016), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/misc/legal_education/2016_accreditation_brochure_final.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ZHT7-2N5H], which states: 
Under Title 34, Chapter VI, §602 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Council and the 
Accreditation Committee of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar are 
recognized by the United States Department of Education (DOE) as the accrediting agency for pro-
grams that lead to the J.D. degree. In this function, the Council and the Section are separate and in-
dependent from the ABA, as required by DOE regulations.  
Stakeholder Group 3: Groups that represent, and are primarily comprised of, 
traditional U.S. lawyer regulators:29  
� the Conference of Chief Justices [of state supreme courts] (“CCJ”) and the 
National Center for State Courts;30 
For information about the history of the CCJ, see CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, THE HISTORY OF THE 
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES: IN COMMEMORATION OF ITS 60TH ANNIVERSARY (2009), https://ccj.ncsc.org/ 
�/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Web%20Documents/CCJ%20History%2061709.ashx [https://perma.cc/23TH- 
425F]. See id. at 35–36 for a discussion of the relationship of the CCJ and the National Center for State Courts. 
� the National Conference of Bar Examiners (“NCBE”), which brings to-
gether, inter alia, the day job regulators who regulate lawyer admissions 
(i.e., entry into the profession); and  
� the National Organization of Bar Counsel (NOBC), which brings together 




29. Stakeholder Group 3 includes stakeholders that do not have direct regulatory power, but are associations 
that represent or include the traditional regulators in Group 2. See, e.g., Terry & Silver, supra note 1, at 416 (re-
ferring to the stakeholders listed in Group 3). 
30. 
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Stakeholder Group 4: Groups that purport to offer expert balanced advice to 
traditional U.S. lawyer regulators:31  
� the American Law Institute (ALI), which drafted the Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers;32 and  
� the American Bar Association when it drafts model provisions for state 
Supreme Courts and purports to be acting as a “quasi-regulator,” rather 
than representing its members’ self-interest or acting as a trade group.33 
See generally ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Policy & Initiatives, ABA, https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ [https://perma.cc/8UDL-LMAN] (last visited May 
20, 2020) (showing ABA policies, many of which were generated by these groups). Although these groups are 
not organizations of regulators, they develop model rules and policies for state supreme court consideration. 
Several authors have observed that the ABA should not act as a “trade group” when acting in this “quasi-reg-
ulator” role. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: Reflections on 
Missed Opportunities and the Road Not Taken, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 95, 117 n.93 (2014) [hereinafter 
Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics] (noting that in addition to its representational or lobbying 
function on behalf of lawyers, the ABA also “acts as a ‘quasi-regulator,’ and should endeavor to offer fair and 
balanced advice to regulators, not advice driven by its members’ own self-interest”); Stephen Gillers, How to 
Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 371– 
74 (2013). 
A number of commentators have questioned the degree to which the ABA’s model lawyer regulation poli-
cies truly reflect balanced expert advice. See, e.g., Terry, Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics, su-
pra, at 120–21 (noting that the ABA has been criticized for confusing its representational and quasi-regulator 
roles); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989)). 
Stakeholder Group 5: Other U.S. regulators whose actions directly affect law-
yer regulation:34  
� the U.S. Congress;  
� state legislatures;  
� state and federal executive or legislative branch agencies, including those 
that implement antitrust, consumer protection, intellectual property, inter-
national trade, securities regulation, and tax policies; and  
� domestic dispute resolution bodies that have adopted rules that apply to 
lawyers appearing before those bodies (to whom such power has been 
delegated). 
31. Stakeholder Group 4 includes entities that provide expertise or advice to traditional lawyer regulators. 
The difference between Groups 3 and 4 is that the stakeholder entities listed in Group 3 consist primarily of reg-
ulators, whereas the stakeholder entities in Group 4 are not primarily regulators, even though they may have 
some regulator members, such as judges. Although the entities listed in Group 4 are not organizations of regula-
tors, they opine on model laws (the American Law Institute), their interpretation (the ABA Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility), or implementation (the ABA Standing Committee on 
Professional Regulation when it issues its confidential evaluations of state lawyer discipline systems). 
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). See also infra note 33 for a discus-
sion of the distinction between acting as a quasi-regulator and acting as a trade group. 
33. 
34. Stakeholder Group 5 includes governmental bodies (and alternative dispute resolution tribunals) whose 
actions affect lawyers, but who have not been viewed as the traditional regulators of lawyers. See, e.g., 
Leubsdorf, supra note 15 (identifying state and federal statutes that apply to lawyers, as well as other nontradi-
tional regulators); Terry, Service Providers, supra note 15, at 205–10 (focusing on potential regulatory impact 
of federal and international developments); cf. ABA Resolution 201A, supra note 9. 
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Stakeholder Group 6: Those who do not have “hard law” regulatory authority 
over lawyers, but interact with lawyers and may be able to enforce regulatory- 
like rules or compliance:35  
� those who employ a particular lawyer;  
� legal malpractice insurers;  
� companies that provide insurance to clients or to others, such as those who 
insure a party opposing a lawyer’s client;  
� lenders (including those who lend money to clients and those who lend 
money to lawyers or law firms); and  
� those who work in the same law firm (or other employment settings) as the 
regulated lawyer. 
Stakeholder Group 7: Those who are directly affected by lawyer regulation 
provisions (but are not the population for whose benefit lawyer regulations are 
adopted):36 
� lawyers whose representation of a client will be directly affected by exist-
ing lawyer regulations; 
� lawyers who are not representing a client, but are subject to lawyer regula-
tory system rules that apply to a lawyer 24/7;  
� a lawyer’s opposing counsel who is subject to rules limiting the tactics that 
opposing counsel may use; and  
� court and judicial system officials and participants, such as clerks and court 
staff. 
Stakeholder Group 8: Those inside the United States who were not previously iden-
tified but have an interest or stake in the outcome of lawyer regulation issues:37  
� future lawyers, including current U.S. law students and those who might 
have been interested but have chosen not to attend law school; 
35. Stakeholder Group 6 includes individuals or entities who are in a position to enforce regulatory-like 
rules. Unlike the stakeholders in Group 5, however, these stakeholders are not governmental bodies. The stake-
holders in Group 6 get their power from voluntarily-created relationships, rather than governmental authority. 
The malpractice insurance carrier is a quintessential example of a Group 6 stakeholder. 
36. Stakeholder Group 7, like Stakeholder Group 1, focuses on the objects of regulation rather than the 
stakeholders imposing regulation, such as the stakeholders in Groups 2 and 6. Although the stakeholders in 
both Groups 1 and 7 will be affected by lawyer regulation, the stakeholders in Group 1 are the individuals or 
entities for whose benefit lawyer regulations are adopted – i.e., those covered by the jurisdiction’s explicit or 
implicit regulatory objectives. See supra note 25. Group 7 stakeholders are not. For example, lawyers are 
clearly affected by lawyer regulation rules, but many, including this author, would conclude that lawyer regula-
tion is not (or should not be) adopted with the goal of benefitting lawyers (e.g., to increase their market share 
compared to other kinds of competitors). 
37. Stakeholder Group 8 is intended as a catch-all category for U.S. stakeholders that have not been 
included in Groups 1-7. Similar to Groups 1 and 7, this category includes individuals and entities that will be 
affected by lawyer regulation (i.e., they are more analogous to the “objects” of regulation than the “actors” 
imposing regulation). While the distinction between Group 7 and Group 8 stakeholders is subtle, I envision 
Group 7 stakeholders as those who are involved in a pending matter where there is an immediate and direct 
impact, whereas Group 8 stakeholders have long-term, less-immediate interests affected by lawyer regulation. 
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� U.S. law schools and their faculty and administration;  
� those who care about our society and the administration of justice;  
� those who would like to employ lawyers but are unable to do so under the 
current lawyer regulatory system which bans outside investment and law-
yer-nonlawyer partnerships;38 
� interest [trade] groups representing certain kinds of actual or potential cli-
ents, such as the Association of Corporate Counsel;39  
See, e.g., ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, https://www.acc.com/ [https://perma.cc/2DF9-VT5W] (last 
visited May 20, 2020) (providing resources for lawyers who work for corporations); AM. BANKERS ASS’N, 
https://www.aba.com/ [https://perma.cc/JRD8-KPD3] (last visited May 20, 2020) (representing banks). 
� interest [trade] groups representing regulators whose lives will be affected 
by the shape and scope of regulation;  
� interest [trade] groups representing lawyers whose professional lives 
will be affected by the shape and scope of regulation, such as the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America [now called the American 
Association for Justice], the International Association of Defense 
Counsel (“IADC”), and the American College of Trusts and Estate 
Counsel (“ACTEC”);40  
See, e.g., Mission & History, AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, https://www.justice.org/who-we-are/mission- 
history [https://perma.cc/6SMT-YVJB] (last visited May 20, 2020); About the Association, INT’L ASS’N OF 
DEFENSE COUNSEL, https://www.iadclaw.org/about/about-the-association/ [https://perma.cc/S7VU-6TFL] (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2020); Purposes of the College, AM. COLLEGE OF TRUSTS & ESTATE COUNSEL, https://www. 
actec.org/about-us/purposes-of-the-college/ [https://perma.cc/7KLX-5J2J] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
� interest [trade] groups that might want the opportunity to serve a particular 
market, such as legal tech providers; 
� interest [trade] groups that consider how various kinds of regulatory provi-
sions will affect the constituencies they represent, such as the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce or Public Citizen;41 and 
� bar associations, when acting in their representational, rather than reg-
ulatory capacity (including subgroups within the association that may 
have interests that conflict with one another or with the parent 
group).42   
See, e.g., About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://www. 
uschamber.com/about/about-the-us-chamber-of-commerce [https://perma.cc/MNF4-BL93] (last visited May 
20, 2020); About Us, PUBLIC CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/MNF4-BL93] (last 
visited May 20, 2020). The author has personal knowledge that both of these organizations have been active on 
issues that affect lawyer regulation such as international trade and anti-money laundering issues. 
38. As explained infra notes 101–18 and accompanying text, Arizona, California, and Utah are among the 
states that are considering changing or eliminating Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, which prohibits fee-shar-
ing or partnerships among lawyers and nonlawyers in the delivery of legal services. Thus, the stakeholders who 
have an interest Rule 5.4 issues include nonlawyers who might want to employ or go into partnership with law-




42. For a discussion of the difference between regulatory and representational bar associations, see supra 
note 27 (citing inter alia the Washington State Bar Resources page). 
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Stakeholder Group 9: Foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, 
and international dispute resolution bodies that have adopted policies or rules 
that may directly or indirectly affect U.S. lawyers and lawyer regulation:43  
� intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World 
Trade Organization, and the Financial Action Task Force, whose policies 
are relevant to lawyer regulation;44  
� international dispute resolution bodies (whose cases may be affected by 
U.S. lawyer regulation or which may have adopted rules that apply to law-
yers and clients appearing before those bodies);45 
See, e.g., PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (PICT), THE INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT, https://elaw.org/system/files/intl%20tribunals%20synoptic_chart2.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/7VZK-V6SB].
and  
� foreign governments whose rules affect U.S. lawyers or lawyer regulation. 
Stakeholder Group 10: Additional individuals or entities outside the United 
States who may be affected by, or care about, U.S. lawyer regulation:46  
� international organizations interested in lawyer regulation issues;47  
See also Practice Rules and Guidelines: Alternative Dispute Resolution, INT’L B. ASS’N, https://www. 
ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx [https://perma.cc/MSN2-CPYK] 
(last visited May 20, 2020) (includes links to the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration (2014), Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration (2013), and Rules on the 
Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2010)). See generally CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014). 
� other organizations, such as the Law Society of England and Wales, that 
might have an interest in having the United States adopt or follow a particu-
lar set of rules or policies;48 and   
43. Stakeholder Group 9 includes international governmental entities, including foreign governments and 
intergovernmental bodies, as well as international arbitral tribunals that are the counterpart to the domestic tri-
bunals included in Group 2. Group 9 is similar to Groups 2 and 5 because these stakeholders are actors who cre-
ate regulation. Group 9’s stakeholders differ from the prior groups because they are not U.S. stakeholders. 
Moreover, unlike the regulators included in Groups 2 and 5, Group 9’s stakeholders may have either an indirect 
or direct impact on U.S. lawyers and lawyer regulation. Examples of direct impact are rules that apply to U.S. 
lawyers and law firms practicing in England and Wales. See generally Legal Services Act, supra note 8. For an 
example of indirect impact, see infra notes 82–84 and 140–46 (discussing FATF-AML impact). 
44. See, e.g., Terry, Service Providers, supra note 15, at 190–99 (describing the potential effect of intergov-
ernmental organizations such as the UN, WTO, and FATF on lawyer regulation). 
45. 
 
46. Stakeholder Group 10 differs from Groups 1-8 because it involves stakeholders who are primarily for-
eign, rather than domestic U.S. stakeholders. (Global networks exist, however, because U.S. stakeholders are 
connected to Group 10 stakeholders.) Group 10 differs from Group 9 because it includes individuals and nongo-
vernmental entities, rather than intergovernmental bodies, foreign governments or international tribunals. 
Group 10 is intended as a “catch-all” international category. Group 10 includes international regulatory 
“actors” analogous to those in Groups 4 and 5, those who are affected by regulation and are thus analogous to 
Groups 1 and 7, and “others,” who are analogous to Group 8. 
47. 
48. In the author’s view, representatives from the Law Society of England and Wales are interested in hav-
ing one or more U.S. jurisdictions adopt rules similar to their alternative business structures or ABS rules. See 
also infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (describing interactions among U.S. and U.K. stakeholders). 
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� individuals or entities located outside the United States who might be 
affected by U.S. lawyer regulation policies.49 
With the exception of some of the stakeholders in the last two categories, the 
stakeholders listed above generally have available to them U.S. domestic net-
works50 to which they might belong. The next Part explains why the lawyer regu-
lation stakeholders listed above also have multiple opportunities to directly 
participate in global networks51 and, why, even when they do not directly partici-
pate in global networks, these stakeholders are likely to be indirectly connected 
to global lawyer regulation stakeholder networks. 
II. FIVE WAYS IN WHICH STAKEHOLDERS INTERACT WITH, OR ARE 
EXPOSED TO, GLOBAL NETWORKS 
This Article would be impossibly long if it tried to document all of the global 
connections of all of the U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders listed in the prior 
Part.52 Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive list of all of the global 
connections of all of these stakeholders, this Part identifies five opportunities 
these stakeholders have to connect directly or indirectly to global networks.53 
After describing each of these opportunities, this Part provides examples that 
illustrate global lawyer regulation networks at work. The examples in this Part 
are intended to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.54 The five opportunities 
described in this Part are: 
� attending in-person meetings that include speakers or attendees from out-
side the United States (or by hearing from speakers or attendees who are 
part of, and have been influenced by, global networks); 
49. See, e.g., Roger J. Goebel, Professional Responsibility Issues in International Law Practice, 29 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1, 17–20, 45–49 (1981) (posing many hypotheticals, including one on page 49 that asked if U.S.- 
licensed attorneys can advise their corporate clients to sell in other countries drugs that were expired or illegal 
in the United States). 
50. See infra Section II.E. 
51. See infra Section II.A–E. 
52. See supra notes 25–50 and accompanying text (listing ten stakeholder categories, each of which 
included a number of illustrative stakeholders, for a total of more than forty stakeholders). 
53. According to a leading network expert, a social network is one in which “the nodes are people (or some-
times groups of people, such as firms or teams) and the edges between them are social connections of some 
kind, such as friendship, communication, or collaboration.” NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 5. Network 
science allows one to visualize the impact of “nodes” that are not directly connected to each other but are indi-
rectly connected through various “edges” or links. See, e.g., id. at 6 (discussing how the study of food webs can 
help us understand and quantify ecological phenomenon and the interdependencies between species). 
54. Because of time and space limitations, this Article does not attempt to document the global connections 
of each of the identified stakeholders. Nevertheless, the illustrative examples show that there are many ways in 
which U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders are connected to global networks. Cf. NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra 
note 2, at 5 (noting that because social network studies often are arduous, they usually are small, such as the fa-
mous study of a karate club that had thirty-four nodes (individuals), but also noting that social network compa-
nies, such as Facebook, have research divisions that collaborate with the academic community to do research 
on social networks using their vast data resources). 
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� participating in virtual meetings or events that include speakers or attend-
ees from outside the United States (or those who are part of a global 
network); 
� reading articles that are written about, or influenced by, global develop-
ments and perspectives;  
� following the work of law reform initiatives inside and outside the United 
States; and 
� being part of a group that communicates with its members through a list-
serv or otherwise, even though the group might, at first glance, seem to be 
wholly domestic. 
The Sections that follow include recent examples of global perspectives within 
each of these five opportunities. 
A. IN-PERSON MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES 
It has become common for in-person meetings of U.S. lawyer regulation stake-
holders to include global information and perspectives that connect U.S. stakehold-
ers to a global network. Consider, for example, the 2019 National Conference on 
Professional Responsibility, which was sponsored by the ABA Center for 
Professional Responsibility.55 
See ABA 45TH NAT’L. CONF. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (Vancouver, May 29–31, 2019) https://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2019_cpr_meetings/2019conf/2019pr- 
conf-sched.pdf [https://perma.cc/KMV4-4R56] [hereinafter 2019 ABA Ethics Conference program]. 
Similar to the ABA’s prior national conferences, this 
conference drew a mix of regulators, legal ethics academics, private practitioners 
(including those who work for law firms that have international offices), and in- 
house counsel, including those who work for malpractice insurance carriers.56 The 
2019 ABA ethics conference was held in Vancouver, Canada, and those who 
attended were exposed either directly (through formal programming) or indirectly 
(through conference conversations and interactions) to global lawyer regulation net-
works.57 The formal programming included a networking breakfast for U.S. and 
Canadian regulators,58 as well as sessions in which U.S. audience members heard 
from Canadian speakers and Canadian audience members heard from U.S. speak-
ers.59 Conference attendees also learned about U.S.-Canadian collaborations that 
might not otherwise have been apparent. For example, the primary speaker during 
the first plenary session was Shannon Salter, who is Chair of the Civil Resolution 
55. 
56. See, e.g., id. (speakers include all of these constituents). The author has personal knowledge that it is 
typical for this conference to include a range of stakeholders. 
57. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
58. See 2019 ABA Ethics Conference program, supra note 55 (listing 7:00 AM May 30, 2019 “Canadian/ 
U.S. International Regulators’ Roundtable”). For a discussion of the history of these breakfasts, see Terry, 
Thirty Years, supra note 1, at 383–84. 
59. See 2019 ABA Ethics Conference program, supra note 55, at Plenary #3 & Breakout #9 (panels included 
a session on technology moderated by the President and CEO of LawPro, which is the mandatory insurance car-
rier for Ontario lawyers, and a session of the future of Rule 5.4, which included the former Executive Director 
of the Nova Scotia regulatory body). 
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Tribunal of British Columbia.60 Ms. Salter explained the development of this online 
government-sponsored dispute resolution tribunal and—in response to a question— 
mentioned that she not only was familiar with the Utah courts’ online dispute resolu-
tion system, but she consulted with Utah regarding its system.61 
The author was present in Vancouver and heard the question and Ms. Salter’s answer. For additional in-
formation about Utah’s ODR system, including screenshots, see Deno Himonas, Utah’s Online Dispute 
Resolution Program, 122 DICK. L. REV. 875 (2018), https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr/vol122/iss3/6 
[https://perma.cc/FY75-TWKM].
The 2019 meeting of the International Conference of Legal Regulators 
(“ICLR”) provides another recent example of an in-person meeting that has helped 
foster global knowledge and connections—in other words, a global network. 
Approximately ten U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders spoke at, or moderated 
sessions at, the 2019 ICLR Conference in Edinburgh.62 
ICLR 2019 Speakers, INT’L CONF. LEGAL REGULATORS, https://www.lawscot.org.uk/members/cpd- 
training/iclr-2019/speakers/ [https://perma.cc/BNA5-7KMV] (last visited May 20, 2020) (speakers and 
moderators included lawyer regulators from Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and representatives from the 
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL) 
Future of Lawyering Committee, the State Bar of California Task Force on Access through Innovation in Legal 
Services, the National Conference of Bar Examiners, and the Utah Supreme Court’s Work Group on Regulatory 
Reform). See also ICLR 2019 Programme, INT’L CONF. LEGAL REGULATORS, https://www.lawscot.org.uk/ 
members/cpd-training/iclr-2019/programme/ [https://perma.cc/PN4U-NAAM] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
There were additional U.S. 
stakeholders who attended even though they were not speakers or moderators.63 
The U.S. speakers, moderators, and attendees included leaders in the National 
Organization of Bar Counsel and National Conference of Bar Examiners who are 
in a position to shape the dialogue within their important regulatory umbrella 
organizations.64 Additional recent conferences that show the global connections of 
U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders include conferences for specific kinds of cli-
ents,65 
See, e.g., 2020 Innovations in Technology Conference, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., https://lscitc2020.sched. 
com/ [https://perma.cc/CYQ7-Z939] (last visited May 20, 2020) (includes speakers from Canada in this 
January 2020 conference focused on increased delivery of legal services to U.S. clients of low and modest 
means); In-Person Education Events, ASS’N CORPORATE COUNSEL, https://www.acc.com/education-events/ 
inperson-education [https://perma.cc/A7SF-PRK2] (last visited May 20, 2020) (listing the October 2020 
Annual Meeting, as well as other events with global content). 
and for legal malpractice and risk management professionals.66 
See, e.g., Hinshaw’s 19th Annual Legal Malpractice & Risk Management (LMRM) Conference, 
HINSHAW, https://www.hinshawlaw.com/f-lmrm-home.html [https://perma.cc/2G6A-7VJ2] (last visited May 
20, 2020) (which includes sessions on U.K. developments and U.K. speakers in this March 2020 conference). 
Hinshaw described its 2020 conference as: 
the industry’s premier event focused on current and important developments in the litigation of 
legal malpractice claims, malpractice insurance, professional responsibility, and risk management 
strategies. . . . [and a] must-attend event for law firm general counsel and managing partners, in- 
house corporate counsel, professional liability practitioners, legal malpractice insurance professio-
nals, and any practicing lawyer concerned with risk management in the practice of law. 




63. Although the conference did not issue a list of attendees, the author has personal knowledge that the 
attendees included U.S. regulators who were neither speakers nor moderators. 
64. See ICLR 2019 Speakers, supra note 62 (the speakers and moderators included Judith Gunderson, who 
is the President of the National Conference of Bar Examiners and Melinda Bentley, who was the immediate 
past president of the National Organization of Bar Counsel). 
65. 
66. 
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Id.; see also ATTORNEYS’ LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOCIETY, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 2019 ALAS ANNUAL GENERAL 
MEETING, https://www.alas.com/public/AGM_Highlights%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8272-BVNE]: 
On the Loss Prevention side, we have expanded our programming, including our General Counsel 
Roundtable for Firms with Foreign Offices in March 2019; a new conference, the Corporate 
Practice Group Leader Consultation Conference (November 14–15, 2019); and the recent redesign 
of our ALAS Loss Prevention Journal, published this summer . . . .). We also have continued with 
our broad range of traditional publications and other programming, including . . . our London Loss 
Prevention Forum (October 2019), addressing liability and regulatory issues arising in our firms’ 
growing international practices.  
Id. ALAS was founded by its owner-insured law firms to provide insurance coverage and its representatives 
periodically share information with other lawyer regulation stakeholders at venues such as the ABA annual 
ethics conference or through service on ABA committees. See generally the programs from the ABA’s annual 
National Conference on Professional Responsibility. See also Tenth General Counsel Compliance and Risk 
Forum 2019, CLYDE & CO., https://www.clydeco.com/events/view/tenth-general-counsel-compliance [https:// 
perma.cc/723B-UY2P] (last visited May 20, 2020) (jointly chaired by U.S. lawyer Anthony Davis and U.K. 
lawyer Richard Harrison). 
When originally drafted, this paragraph was a “placeholder” for later content 
that would describe the March 20, 2020 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 
Symposium. Although Georgetown’s live Symposium was canceled because of 
the COVID-19 pandemic,67 this cancellation, as well as Volume 33(4) of the 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, illustrate this Article’s overarching point 
that global networks can have a powerful impact.68 
See supra note 67 (citing the cancellation of the live Symposium and citing Volume 33(4), which 
includes articles that describe or cite international events). For information about the impact of COVID-19, see 
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://covid19.who.int/ [https:// 
perma.cc/872G-8WLC] (last visited May 20, 2020); Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Cases in U.S., 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases- 
updates/cases-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/HZ5L-E2TP] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
Although COVID-19 has led to the cancellation of additional in-person meet-
ings, even canceled in-person meetings can help connect U.S. lawyer regulation 
stakeholders to global networks and perspectives. For example, until the COVID- 
19 pandemic led to its cancellation, the UCLA School of Law planned to host the 
2020 International Legal Ethics Conference (“ILEC”).69 
International Legal Ethics Conference 2020: Lawyers in Divided Times, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, 
https://law.ucla.edu/centers/interdisciplinary-studies/program-on-legal-ethics-and-the-profession/events/ilec- 
2020/ [https://perma.cc/2NDA-SZXU] (last visited May 20, 2020). The ILEC 2020 conference was cancelled 
on March 26, 2020. See E-mail from Scott Cummings, UCLA Professor of Law, to the author and many others 
(Mar. 26, 2020) (announcing the cancellation of the July 23–25, 2020 conference) (on file with author). The 
email explained that this “difficult decision was made in close consultation with the International Association 
of Legal Ethics, whose board unanimously agreed cancellation was necessary.” Id. This Board consists of 
members from around the world. See Officers & Directors, INT’L ASS’N OF LEGAL ETHICS, https://iaole.org/ 
officers-directors/ [https://perma.cc/JJ73-NNNQ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
Although the 2020 
67. See E-mail from Devlin Woods, GJLE Vol. XXXIII Editor-in-Chief, to Symposium Speakers (Mar. 11, 
2020) (on file with author) (“This morning, Georgetown Law canceled any in-person events, both on and off- 
campus, until May 10, 2020. It is with a heavy heart that we unfortunately must cancel our Symposium.”) 
Although the live Symposium was cancelled, Volume 33(4) of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics is the 
Symposium issue and will have articles by authors who have global connections and whose articles include in-
formation from countries outside the United States. See infra note 187. 
68. 
69. 
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ILEC conference was cancelled, because notice of this California conference was 
widely circulated within the U.S. legal ethics community, it undoubtedly helped 
increase U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholder awareness of global network 
opportunities.70 
See, e.g., E-mail from Scott Cummings, UCLA Professor of Law, to the AALS Professional 
Responsibility Section listserv and three other listserv groups, UCLA—Register soon! Early Bird Deadline is 
February 28! (Feb. 18, 2020) (reminding numerous listserv recipients of the registration deadline for this 
California conference). These listserv notices might have been particularly informative for those who have 
recently joined the lawyer regulation stakeholder community. ILEC conferences are typically held every other 
year and the 2018 ILEC conference was held in Melbourne, Australia. See ILEC Conferences, INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL ETHICS (last visited Jan. 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3YHY-VGYS]. The 2016 ILEC 
conference, which took place in New York at Fordham Law, included academics from approximately seventy 
U.S. law schools, along with individuals from more than sixty countries. See Terry, Thirty Years, supra note 1, 
at 382. 
There are additional in-person conferences affected by COVID-19 that have 
increased U.S. stakeholder awareness of, and connection to, global networks. For 
example, the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL) had 
been planning to co-host with the Law Society of England and Wales an April 
2020 conference in London; even though this conference has been postponed 
because of COVID-19, the planning process brought together U.S. and U.K. 
stakeholders.71 
See ASS’N PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, Save the Date—London 2020, https://aprl.net/save-the- 
date-london-2020/ [https://perma.cc/3PDJ-54D3] (last visited May 20, 2020); ASS’N PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
LAWYERS, International Meeting Agenda (Apr. 30, 2020), https://aprl.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/london- 
program-3-3-2020-rev-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B58-96QL] (last visited May 20, 2020); APRL/LAW 
SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, AGENDA: TRANSATLANTIC LEGAL ETHICS 2020: CURRENT ISSUES IN LAW 
FIRM REGULATION AND LEGAL ETHICS IN A POST-BREXIT WORLD (May 1, 2020) https://aprl.net/wp-content/ 
uploads/2020/03/Transatlantic-Flyer.02.26.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QT2-VR3S] (last visited May 20, 
2020); APRL’s Next Meeting, ASS’N PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, https://aprl.net/next-meeting/ [https:// 
perma.cc/67R6-V2EJ] (last visited May 20, 2020) (“The International and Joint Meetings in London, UK, will 
be rescheduled from April 30 and May 1, 2020 to a future date. Please check back for updates.”). 
APRL’s Spring 2020 London conference built on connections 
that were made during the November 2018 conference called Crisscrossing the 
Pond: Transatlantic Issues in Legal Ethics and Law Firm Regulation that was 
jointly sponsored by APRL and the Law Society of England and Wales.72 
See APRL/LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, Agenda (Nov. 8–9, 2018), https://aprl.net/wp- 
content/uploads/2018/11/Agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4UX-KDJZ].
Similarly, although the October 2020 International Conference of Legal 
Regulators will now be held online due to COVID-19, it has already connected 
U.S. stakeholders to a global network: It is hosted by the Attorney Regulation and 
Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois, a regulatory body, 
and has been publicized within the United States and elsewhere.73 
See, e.g., Chicago 2020, INT’L CONF. OF LEGAL REGULATORS, https://iclr.net/conference/chicago-2020/ 
[https://perma.cc/LWX8-DN8E] (last visited June 12, 2020). For information about the ICLR, see Laurel S. 
Terry, Creating an International Network of Lawyer Regulators: The 2012 International Conference of Legal 
Regulators, 82(2) BAR EXAMINER 18 (June 2013) (describing the first meeting in London of what has become 
the International Conference of Legal Regulators). 
Although one could cite many more examples of in-person meetings that foster 
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different categories of lawyer regulation stakeholders participate in in-person 
meetings that expose them to global perspectives and global networks. 
B. VIRTUAL MEETINGS AND EVENTS 
In addition to in-person meetings, another method by which U.S. lawyer stake-
holders connect to, or are exposed to, global lawyer regulation stakeholder net-
works is through virtual meetings or events. Even before COVID-19, virtual 
meetings and conferences provided an opportunity for individuals from different 
countries to engage with those who have similar interests. For example, APRL 
has established a Future of Lawyering committee, which is conducting its work 
through various subcommittees.74 
See, e.g., The Future of Lawyering Special Committee, ASS’N PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, 
https://aprl.net/aprl-future-of-the-legal-profession-special-committee/ [https://perma.cc/2J8U-CCSL] (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
Although many would think of APRL as a 
“domestic” group, the APRL subcommittees include participants from Australia, 
Canada, and England, as well as the United States.75 Most of the work of these 
APRL subcommittees has been handled through virtual meetings, rather than in- 
person meetings.76 The international composition of these APRL committees cre-
ates a ripple effect through the larger APRL community. 
The National Organization of Bar Counsel’s Entity Regulation Subcommittee pro-
vides another example that shows how virtual meetings can facilitate global net-
works. This “Global Resources” subcommittee, which was appointed by NOBC’s 
then-president Tracy Kepler, developed the Entity Regulation and Proactive 
Regulation Global Resources FAQ documents that discuss global developments.77 
See Alternative Business Structures Committee FAQ, NAT’L ORG. BAR COUNSEL, https://www.nobc. 
org/resources/Documents/State%20Disciplinary%20Flowcharts/Alternate.Business.Structures.FAQ.Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6V29-JVMM] (last visited May 20, 2020); Proactive Regulation FAQ document, NAT’L 
ORG. BAR COUNSEL, https://www.nobc.org/resources/Documents/Entity%20Regulation/2017-6-22%20FAQs 
%20NOBC%20Proactive%20regulation%20Committee.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK49-VKUV] (last visited May 
20, 2020). 
The NOBC Entity Regulation subcommittee conducted most, if not all, of its work 
through virtual meetings.78 Even though many would think of the NOBC as a 
“domestic” organization, the participants in these virtual meetings included individu-
als from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States.79 
See, e.g., Global Resources: Information for Entity and Proactive Regulation, NAT’L ORG. BAR 
COUNSEL, [https://perma.cc/5MYJ-MBWE] (listing subcommittee members from Australia, Canada, and 
England). The author has personal knowledge that the other NOBC Global Resources subcommittees either 
included international members or reviewed international information. 
74. 
75. See, e.g., E-mail from David Bell to APRL Subcommittee Members (Nov. 18, 2019) (on file with 
author) (recipients of correspondence include individuals from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as 
well as the United States). 
76. See, e.g., ASS’N OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, FUTURE OF LAWYERING COMMITTEE—RULE 5.4 
SUBCOMMITTEE, Meeting Notes from September 17, 2019 (on file with author). The author has personal knowl-
edge that the APRL Future of Lawyer Subcommittees have primarily met through virtual meetings, rather than 
in-person meetings. 
77. 
78. The author has personal knowledge of this fact. 
79. 
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Because the documents this committee produced were posted on the NOBC’s 
“Global Resources” public webpage for a number of years and are still available in 
the members only section, the information this global network assembled was 
broadly dispersed among U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders.80 
See, e.g., supra note 79; Jurisdictions’ Activity on Alternative Licensed Legal Professionals, NAT’L 
ORG. OF BAR COUNSEL (July 1, 2015), https://nobc.org/resources/Documents/Alternative%20LIcensure/NOBC 
%20-%20Alternative%20Licensure%20Table%20(00139906).pdf [https://perma.cc/X24L-VHXQ]; State and 
International Reciprocity, NAT’L ORG. OF BAR COUNSEL, [https://perma.cc/J6HD-Y23M] (last visited May 20, 
2020); see also E-mail from Melinda Bentley, NOBC Immediate Past President, to author (Feb. 13, 2020) (on 
file with author) (noting that because of its age, the Global Resources webpage was moved to the “members 
only” section of the website). The previously-public version of the Global Resources webpage is archived at 
Global Resources, NAT’L ORG. BAR COUNSEL, [https://perma.cc/7ZBD-RS3F] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
The State Bar of Georgia’s International Trade in Legal Services (“ITILS”) 
Committee further illustrates how virtual meetings promote global connections 
and networks. This Committee conducts regular in-person meetings, but it also 
offers a telephone conference option.81 During one of its meetings, the 
Committee invited a representative from the Council of Bars and Law Societies 
of Europe to make a lengthy telephone presentation to the Committee members 
regarding anti-money laundering regulations in Europe.82 As a result of the repre-
sentative’s “virtual,” rather than in-person participation, Georgia lawyers from 
large and small firms and from in-house and government practice settings heard 
about the EU’s experiences.83 After this conversation and additional discussions, 
the Georgia ITILS Committee recommended an ethics rule change that would, in 
essence, add an anti-money laundering due diligence obligation to Georgia’s 
ethics rules.84 
The LawWithoutWalls program, which has been operating for approximately 
one decade, provides an additional example of the power of virtual meetings to 
create global networks. This semester-long course, which is offered to law stu-
dents and business students from universities around the globe, has also served to 
connect the program’s thought leaders and mentors, who include law faculty, 
entrepreneurs, and practitioners from many different countries.85 
See LAWWITHOUTWALLS, https://lawwithoutwalls.org/ [https://perma.cc/5BH5-3K2C] (last visited 
May 20, 2020); see also Gary Blankenship, UM’S Law Without Walls Pursues International Solutions to Legal, 
Business Problems, Florida Bar News (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/ums- 
law-without-walls-pursues-international-solutions-to-legal-business-problems/ [https://perma.cc/JZ53-6CQE]; 
FT Innovative Lawyers Awards North America, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 2018), https://live.ft.com/Events/2018/ 
FT-Innovative-Lawyers-Awards-North-America [https://perma.cc/S4DC-FFWE] (LawWithoutWalls was 
shortlisted and placed second in North America for “Innovation in Collaboration”); Project Teams, 
LAWWITHOUTWALLS, http://lawwithoutwalls.org/teams-1 [https://perma.cc/5JWZ-8EJX] (last visited May 20, 
2020) (includes links to team members from multiple years). 
80. 
81. The author has personal knowledge of these facts. 
82. The author has personal knowledge of the Committee’s work on this issue and the fact that CCBE staff 
lawyer Peter McNamee made a presentation by telephone to the Georgia ITILS Committee. 
83. Id. 
84. Id.; see infra notes 140–46 and accompanying text for additional information on this topic. 
85. 
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Although this Section has included only a handful of examples, they demon-
strate that virtual meetings and events can serve as a vehicle to disperse global 
perspectives and knowledge among lawyer regulation stakeholders and can create 
global networks. Moreover, as a result of the “virtual meeting” expertise that 
many lawyer regulation stakeholders have gained as a result of the stay-at-home 
COVID-19 orders, there undoubtedly will be even more virtual meetings in the 
future and they will help connect U.S. stakeholders to global networks. 
C. LITERATURE WRITTEN ABOUT, OR INFLUENCED BY, GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 
In addition to the information from global networks that U.S. lawyer regulation 
stakeholders are exposed to by attending in-person or virtual meetings, U.S. 
stakeholders may be exposed to information from global networks while quietly 
reading in their offices. This is because the materials from the in-person or virtual 
meetings described in the prior Sections may be archived and either publicly- 
accessible or available to members who didn’t attend the meetings.86 
National Conference on Professional Responsibility, ABA CNTR. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/events_cle/archiveconferencemeetings/ [https://perma.cc/ 
X7V5-JYBC] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
For exam-
ple, one of the benefits of an APRL membership is access to the materials from 
conferences that one did not attend;87 
Download Meeting Materials, ASS’N OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, https://aprl.net/download- 
meeting-materials/ [https://perma.cc/9ZNT-KBYE] (requires member access) (last visited May 20, 2020). 
the same is likely true for some of the other 
seemingly “domestic” stakeholder networks. 
Written information from global networks is not limited to the contents of 
archived conference material. To illustrate the increased opportunities to read 
global perspectives, consider the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, which is 
one of the leading journals in the field of legal ethics and lawyer regulation.88 
See, e.g., Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics: Prospective Members, GEO. L. LIBRARY, https://www. 
law.georgetown.edu/legal-ethics-journal/prospective-members/ [https://perma.cc/KQ7P-ZHWH] (last visited 
May 20, 2020) (“The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics is America’s leading ethics journal. As the second 
most-cited journal at Georgetown, GJLE is also in the top 100 journals nationally, and one of the nation’s most- 
cited student-run specialty journals.”); Terry, Thirty Years, supra note 1, at 368 (“[The GJLE] became a ‘must 
read’ publication for many legal ethics academics. The GJLE has served as part of the ‘gel’ that has bound the 
legal ethics community together and that has educated the ethics community about current developments and 
debates.”). 
One study found a dramatic increase in internationally-influenced articles 
between 1987 and 2017; its data found that there was more than a six-fold 
(600%) increase in internationally-influenced articles from the first decade of 




89. See Terry, Thirty Years, supra note 1, at 371 (citing the increase from six articles in the first decade to 
forty articles in the third decade, but not citing the 600% figure). For a discussion of the methodology used in 
this article and the ways in which it was both underinclusive and overinclusive, see id. at 369. This article found 
that during the first decade of the Journal’s publication, there were six articles influenced by international devel-
opments. Id. at 370. During its second decade, which was between 1997–2006, the Journal published eighteen 
articles that were about or influenced by international developments. Id. During the third decade of its 
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“an increase in global networks, dialogue, and collaboration” was one of the 
explanations for the dramatic increase in internationally-influenced articles.90 
The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics is not the only publication where law-
yer regulation stakeholders might be exposed to perspectives shaped by global 
lawyer regulation networks. These kinds of perspectives can also be found in the 
law review issues memorializing the annual Colloquia of the Fordham Stein 
Center for Law and Ethics,91 
See generally Publications and Films: Fordham Law Review Ethics Books, FORDHAM SCHOOL OF LAW 
STEIN CENTRE FOR LAW & ETHICS, https://www.fordham.edu/info/23524/publications_and_films [https:// 
perma.cc/77FL-KQNX] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
the Symposium issue of The Professional Lawyer, 
which is published by the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility,92 
See generally Journal of the Professional Lawyer, ABA CNTR. PROF’L. RESPONSIBILITY, https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/journal_of_the_professional_lawyer_home/ 
[https://perma.cc/FWV9-HEHX] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
the 
International Journal of the Legal Profession,93 
See generally International Journal of the Legal Profession, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE, https://www. 
tandfonline.com/loi/cijl20 [https://perma.cc/8664-V8BV] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
and in a myriad of journal 
articles written by stakeholders who have been exposed to global developments 
and perspectives.94 
The Bar Examiner magazine regularly publishes globally-influenced articles for admissions regulators. 
See, e.g., Diane F. Bosse, Testing Foreign-Trained Applicants in a New York State of Mind, 83(4) THE BAR 
EXAMINER 31, 31–37 (Dec. 2014); Judith A. Gundersen, President’s Page, 88(3) THE BAR EXAMINER 8 (Fall 
2019) (discussing the ICLR conference); Franklin R. Harrison, Letter from the Chair, 81(4) THE BAR 
EXAMINER 2, 3 (Dec. 2012) (discussing the first ICLR meeting). For additional Bar Examiner articles with an 
international focus, consult the author dropdown menu in the archive for articles by Julian Lonbay, Alan 
Treleaven, and others: Search Article Archives, THE BAR EXAMINER, https://thebarexaminer.org/search-article- 
archives/ [https://perma.cc/H5BN-UV3E] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
This sampling is not a comprehensive list—there are many 
more publications that a lawyer might read in his or her office that would contain 
global perspectives, including items such as surveys and benchmarking data from 
the Association of Corporate Counsel.95 
See, e.g., ASS’N CORP. COUNSEL, 2015 ACC GLOBAL CENSUS: A PROFILE OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, [https://perma.cc/5QLB-PZZ3] (reviewing the global issues that in-house counsel 
encounter); ASS’N CORP. COUNSEL, ACC CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS 2018 SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 
[https://perma.cc/3C9V-9YLU] (summarizing annual survey results from in-house counsel, 64% of whom had 
their offices in the United States and citing global issues that keep them up at night, such as cyberattacks). 
Moreover, even if a U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholder chooses not to read any 
of the articles by international authors or about international developments, the 
authors they do choose to read may themselves be part of a global network (or 
may follow the work of those who are part of a global dialogue and network). To 
illustrate this point, consider the “drivers of change” section of a report by Dr. 
Marı́a J. Esteban. In 2017, Dr. Esteban prepared a Phase I report for the 
International Bar Association’s (“IBA”) Presidential Task Force on the Future of  
existence, between 2007–2016, the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics published more than forty articles that 
were about international developments or influenced by them. Id. 
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Legal Services.96 
See Marı́a J. Esteban, Phase I: Drivers of Change for Legal Services of the Task Force, INT’L B. ASS’N 
(Oct. 9, 2017), [https://perma.cc/W7SS-CAHU] [hereinafter IBA Phase I report]; see also Presidential Task 
Force on the Future of Legal Services, Presentation Slides 23, INT’L B. ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/4X6N- 
APMP]; Presidential Task Force on the Future of Legal Services, INT’L. BAR ASS’N, https://www.ibanet.org/ 
Task-Force-on-the-Future-of-Legal-Services.aspx [https://perma.cc/89LJ-Z75V] (last visited May 20, 2020) 
(Task Force webpage includes multiple links of interest). In addition to her position at ESADE Law School in 
Spain, Dr. Esteban is a Senior Research Fellow at the Harvard Law School Center for the Legal Profession and 
a frequent co-author with Harvard Professor David Wilkins. See ESADE Faculty Directory, Maria Jose 
Esteban Ferrer, ESADE, https://www.esade.edu/faculty/mariajose.esteban [https://perma.cc/L7XT-FWBQ] 
(last visited May 20, 2020). 
Figure 4 in the Phase I report shows frequent cross-citation by 
authors from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.97 
The authors who were listed included noted U.S. legal profession scholars such 
as Harvard’s David Wilkins and Stanford’s Deborah Rhode, whose influence is 
not limited to issues that involve international developments.98 This cross-citation 
data suggests that U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders don’t need to read interna-
tionally-focused articles in order to be exposed to the views of those who partici-
pate in, and are exposed to, global conversations and global networks of lawyer 
regulation stakeholders. 
D. LAW REFORM INITIATIVES 
Another way in which lawyer regulation stakeholders are exposed to global net-
works is by participating in, or passively following, lawyer regulation law reform 
efforts. For example, before New York adopted its “court navigator” program,99 
96. 
97. See IBA Phase I report, supra note 96, at 57 (Figure 4: Academic Authors by Percentage of Cross 
Citations). Citation network studies, such as that conducted by Professor Esteban, are a common way to study 
information networks. See NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that a “much studied example of an 
information network is a citation network, such as the network of citations between academic journal articles”). 
Although an information network, such as a citation network, may be closely related to a social network, in the 
former, the network nodes that are measured are information, whereas in a social network, the nodes that are 
measured are individuals. See id. at 4–5. 
98. See IBA Phase I report, supra note 96, at 57–66 (Figure 4 and Table 6–Cross Citations in the Phase 1 
Report). The U.S. authors listed in Figure 4 included Professors Deborah Rhode (12.9%), William Henderson 
(11.8%), David Wilkins (9.9%), Marc Galanter (9.9%), Tahlia Gordon (Australian erroneously listed as U.S.), 
Carole Silver (8.8%), Laurel Terry (7.3%), Larry Ribstein (7.3%), Elizabeth Chambliss (7.0%), D. Martin Katz 
(5.9%), Russell Pearce (5.5%), Renee Knake (5.5%), Tanina Rostain (5.5%), Paul Lippe (4.7%), Ben Barton 
(4.7%), Robert Nelson (4.4%), Stephanie Kimbro (4.0%), Eli Wald (4.0%), Bryant Garth (3.6%). See also 
NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 37–39 (discussing citation networks) and at 9 (noting that a recent topic 
of research “has been the investigation of the effects of hubs [i.e., nodes that have unusually high connections] 
on the performance and behavior of networked systems. A wide range of results, both empirical and theoretical, 
indicate that hubs can have a disproportionate effect, particularly on network resilience and transport phenom-
ena, despite being few in number.”). 
99. See Fern Fisher, Navigating the New York Courts with the Assistance of a Non-Lawyer, 122 DICK. L. 
REV. 825 (2018). This article was written by the first administrator of New York’s court navigator program. 
The appendix to this article is the evaluation of New York’s court navigator program prepared under the aus-
pices of the American Bar Foundation and the National Center for State Courts. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & 
THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESEARCH REPORT OF 
AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY COURT NAVIGATORS PROGRAM AND ITS THREE PILOT PROJECTS (Dec. 
2016). 
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the New York City Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility issued a report 
on the proposals that also included a discussion of initiatives in England and 
Wales.100 
NEW YORK CITY BAR COMM. ON PROF’L. RESPONSIBILITY, NARROWING THE “JUSTICE GAP”: ROLES 
FOR NONLAWYER PRACTITIONERS 21–24 (2013), https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072450-Role 
sforNonlawyerPractitioners.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ERR-G8QF] (discussing nonlawyer advisers in England 
and Wales, including “McKenzie Friends” and “lay advocates”). 
Many people are likely to be familiar with the New York navigator pro-
gram, even if they are not familiar with the foreign initiatives that may have influ-
enced it. 
Some of the most high-profile recent legal services reform initiatives are found 
in Arizona, California, Illinois, and Utah.101 As the discussion below shows, the 
relevant committees in each of these states are connected to global networks and 
have heard about initiatives in other countries. Consider, for example, the State 
Bar of California’s Task Force on Access Through Innovation in Legal Services 
(“ATILS”).102 
See Task Force on Access Through Innovation of Legal Services, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http:// 
www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Committees/Task-Force-on-Access-Through-Innovation-of-Legal- 
Services [https://perma.cc/7GUR-LU74] (last visited May 20, 2020) (Task Force homepage, which includes 
basic information). 
Part of the impetus for the creation of this task force was Professor 
Bill Henderson’s 2018 Legal Market Landscape Report, which described, inter 
alia, developments in Australia and the United Kingdom.103 
WILLIAM D. HENDERSON, LEGAL MARKET LANDSCAPE REPORT 26-27 (July 2018), http://board.calbar. 
ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000022382.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2KM-UTL5]. Professor 
Henderson’s report is Attachment A to the State Bar of California Board of Trustees’ Agenda Item 703 (July 
2018). The introductory paragraph of this agenda item explains why the report was commissioned. The agenda 
states that “Next steps include Board consideration of a task force to prepare policy and implementation 
recommendations.” Id. at 2. The State Bar of California is a unified bar that exercises regulatory authority over 
California’s lawyers. See About Us: Our Mission, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.calbar.ca.gov/ 
About-Us/Our-Mission [https://perma.cc/W8ED-KKLA] (last visited May 20, 2020); see also Terry, Proactive 
Regulation, supra note 5, at 798 (summarizing in Appendix 5 ABA data about the functions of unified state 
bars, including California). 
The California 
ATILS Task Force subsequently received additional information about global 
trends and developments.104 Because the California State Bar circulated for pub-
lic comment recommendations that proposed significant regulatory changes,105 
See Options for Regulatory Reforms to Promote Access to Justice, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http:// 
www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Our-Mission/Protecting-the-Public/Public-Comment/Public-Comment-Archives/ 
2019-Public-Comment/Options-for-Regulatory-Reforms-to-Promote-Access-to-Justice [https://perma.cc/86BK- 
PH4D] (last visited May 20, 2020). The supporting documents that were available as links included: STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Paving the Future for Access, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/publicComment/2019/ 
Infographic_PavingTheFuture_V3.pdf [https://perma.cc/47H5-YWC6] (last visited May 20, 2020); Overview 
Memo and Full List of Concepts for Regulatory Changes Under Consideration: STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 
PUBLIC INPUT REQUESTED BY THE TASK FORCE ON ACCESS THROUGH INNOVATION OF LEGAL SERVICES (2019), 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/publicComment/2019/List-of-Tentative-Recommendations-Memo- 
For-Public-Comment.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D8A-JHLW]; and STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR TASK 
FORCE ON ACCESS THROUGH INNOVATION OF LEGAL SERVICES REPORT: REQUEST TO CIRCULATE TENTATIVE 
100. 
101. All of these initiatives, except the initiative in Illinois, were featured in Breakout Panel #9 at the 2019 
National Conference on Professional Responsibility. See supra note 55 for the 2019 ABA Ethics Conference 
program and infra notes 108–22 for links. 
102. 
103. 
104. See generally Task Force on Access Through Innovation of Legal Services, supra note 102. 
105. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, http://board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem 
1000024450.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2RS-8FTM] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020); and the webpage of the Task 
Force on Access Through Innovation of Legal Services at Task Force on Access Through Innovation of Legal 
Services, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Committees/ 
Task-Force-on-Access-Through-Innovation-of-Legal-Services [https://perma.cc/PA6B-CDYJ] (last visited 
May 20, 2020). Id. In March 2020, the California Task Force issued its Final Report and Recommendations and 
in May 2020, the State Bar trustees voted, intra alia, to create a working group to consider the development of 
a regulatory sandbox approach. Links to the March 2020 Final Report and subsequent action are available on 
the IAALS “Unlocking Legal Regulation Knowledge Center” webpage, infra note 120. 
many lawyer regulation stakeholders, including those located outside of 
California, are familiar with the work product of the California Task Force. For 
example, the California reform initiative was mentioned during the 2020 
Association of American Law Schools’ Annual Meeting session that was organ-
ized by the Section on Professional Responsibility.106 
Professional Responsibility, Co-Sponsored by Alternative Dispute Resolution and Continuing Legal 
Education, ASS’N. AM. LAW SCHOOLS (Jan. 4, 2020), https://memberaccess.aals.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx? 
webcode=SesDetails&ses_key=3a5664e8-4d30-4771-903c-76e0a1c443a3 [https://perma.cc/8VMC-K934] 
(last visited May 20, 2020). 
Thus, whether they are 
aware of it or not, U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders who are following the 
work of the California ATILS Task Force are indirectly exposed to the global net-
works and conversations that have helped shaped the California discussions.107 
See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, MEMORANDUM ON STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON ACCESS 
THROUGH INNOVATION OF LEGAL SERVICES REPORT: REQUEST TO CIRCULATE TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (July 11, 2019), http://board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem10000 
24450.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2RS-8FTM] (showing comments by former U.K. regulator Crispin Passmore to the 
Task Force); Jordan Furlong, The Coming End of Lawyer Control Over Legal Regulation, SLAW (Feb. 8, 2019), 
http://www.slaw.ca/2019/02/08/the-coming-end-of-lawyer-control-over-legal-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/ 
M33V-9R52] (discussion of U.S. developments in a Canadian publication); Jonathan Goldsmith, Lessons on 
Legal Tech From the US, LAW GAZETTE (Oct. 2019), https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/commentary-and-opinion/ 
lessons-on-legal-tech-from-the-us/5101712.article [https://perma.cc/7MNM-EW77] (discussion of U.S. 
developments in an English legal publication). These examples illustrate the global conversations that take 
place around law reform initiatives. 
Law reform initiatives in Arizona and Utah provide additional opportunities 
for stakeholders to be exposed to global conversations. The Utah law reform 
initiative has received significant attention because of its ground-breaking 
decisions and its quick pace.108 
See, e.g., AALS 2020 Program, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, https://memberaccess.aals. 
org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?WebKey=51F9EC45-5CD0-4957-BE72-C4B89FD07778&RegPath=EventRegFees 
&REg_evt_key=bcc3d06a-9b37-467d-8916-ca46aa97a78f&Site=AALS [https://perma.cc/MZW4-99SL] (listing 
the Saturday, Jan. 4, 2020, session at 10:30 AM–12:15 PM of the Section on Professional Responsibility, Co- 
Sponsored by Alternative Dispute Resolution and Continuing Legal Education entitled “Confronting the Big 
Questions About the Regulation of the Legal Profession”). The author has personal knowledge that the panel 
discussed these Utah developments. 
In August 2019, the Utah Work Group on 
Regulatory Reform issued a lengthy report that recommended relaxation or 
elimination of the lawyer-nonlawyer partnership and fee-sharing ban found in 
Rule 5.4,109 
See THE UTAH WORK GROUP ON REGULATORY REFORM, NARROWING THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE GAP BY 
REIMAGINING REGULATION 15 (Aug. 2019), https://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FINAL- 
Task-Force-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRY5-3UXE] [hereinafter UTAH WORK GROUP REPORT]. “[W]e 
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begin with the establishment of a pilot project or “regulatory sandbox.”110 On 
August 28, 2019, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously voted “to approve pursu-
ing changes to the regulatory structure for legal services” and announced that the 
next step would be “to create an implementation task force, which will begin work 
on putting the recommended changes in place.”111 
Press Release, Administrative Office of the [Utah] Courts, Utah Supreme Court Adopts 
Groundbreaking Changes To Legal Service Regulation (Aug. 29, 2019), available at https://www.utahbar.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Supreme-Court-Regulatory-Reform-PR-8-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WFR-THYZ].
By September 2019, the Court 
had adopted an order creating this task force.112 
See Utah Supreme Court, Standing Order No. 14 (effective Sept. 9, 2019), available at https://www. 
utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urap/Supctso.htm [https://perma.cc/5KV6-7VMC] (regarding creation of the Task 
Force on Regulatory Reform); UTAH IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY REFORM, https:// 
sandbox.utcourts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/3B4D-W5Q4] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (including information on 
the proposed regulatory scope for the Task Force and regulatory sandbox initiative, the proposed structure 
and approximate timetable for this initiative, proposed data collection requirements for sandbox 
participants, and a form inviting contact from those interested in participating in a sandbox initiative, 
among other items). 
These far-reaching developments 
took place against the background of global developments and conversations. For 
example, Appendix C to the Utah final report is a discussion of the U.K.’s 2007 
Legal Services Act and its aftermath.113 Thus, U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders 
who are following the Utah developments have been exposed—directly or 
indirectly—to global perspectives and networks. 
Arizona provides another example. The Arizona Task Force on the Delivery of 
Legal Services has also issued a report that calls for the elimination of Rule 5.4 
(as well as nine other recommendations).114 
ARIZ. SUP. CT. TASK FORCE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 
4, 2019), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/LSTF/Report/LSTFReportRecommendationsRED10042019.pdf? 
ver=2019-10-07-084849-750 [https://perma.cc/KP8B-9UUA].
The October 2019 Arizona Report 
contains a brief reference to U.K. developments,115 but it is clear that the Task 
Force received additional materials about developments outside the United 
States, including Professor Henderson’s report.116 
See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. TASK FORCE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., DRAFT MINUTES 2 (Jan. 7, 
2019), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/LSTF/Minutes/2019/2019MinutesLSTF.pdf?ver=2019-08-06- 
114425-273 [https://perma.cc/4RKP-KGQW] (“Judge Cruz then reported that the work group determined that 
the topic of alternative business structures was likely to be where the most time was spent researching and 
discussing ideas. She noted that Arizona could look to Washington D.C., England and Australia to see what 
they had done and noted that California recently convened a committee to look at the topic as well.”). The 
Arizona Task Force heard from Professor Henderson about the Legal Market Landscape Report he prepared for 
the State Bar of California and received a copy of that report. Id. at 1 (“[Professor Henderson] presented on the 
legal market landscape. Professor Henderson conducted a study of the legal market for California and the 
report from his study was available through the meeting materials.”). Professor Henderson’s Legal Market 
Landscape Report discussed U.K. and Australian developments. See supra note 103 (citing pp. 26–27, which is 
Section 4.3 of Professor Henderson’s report). 
Thus, anyone who follows the 
view the elimination or substantial relaxation of Rule 5.4 as key to allowing lawyers to fully and comfortably 
participate in the technological revolution. Without such a change, lawyers will be at risk of not being able to 
engage with entrepreneurs across a wide swath of platforms.” Id. 




113. Utah Work Group Report, supra note 109, at 40–53. 
114. 
 
115. Id. at 13. 
116. 
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The “Resources” link at the bottom of the Arizona Task Force webpage connects to a “LSTF Resources” 
webpage with resources on international developments. See Legal Services Task Force Webpage, ARIZONA 
JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.azcourts.gov/cscommittees/Legal-Services-Task-Force [https://perma.cc/ 
C4GF-BUQ6] (which links to LSTF Resources); ARIZONA JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.azcourts.gov/ 
cscommittees/Legal-Services-Task-Force/LSTF-Resources [https://perma.cc/YA7K-X5P2] (listing resources 
such as the ABA “Issues Paper Concerning Alternative Business Structures” and the NOBC’s “Alternative Business 
Structures Frequently Asked Questions” document, both of which discussed international developments). 
Arizona law reform initiative has been exposed at least indirectly to the global 
networks that are discussing lawyer regulation and legal services reforms.117 
At the time this Article was written, it was not clear when the Arizona Task Force recommendations 
would be implemented. See In re Petition to Amend Rules 31, 32, 41, 42 (ERs 1.0-5.7),46-51, 54-58, 60, 75 and 
76, and Adopt New Rule, Ariz. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/LSTF/Report/ 
RulePetitionandAppendicesRed.pdf?ver=2020-01-30-142830-090 [https://perma.cc/6RT7-TR9J] (requesting 
court implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations). Regardless of whether the recommendations are 
implemented, those who have been following this law reform initiative have been indirectly exposed to global 
conversations about the proper scope of lawyer regulation. 
The Chicago Bar Association and Chicago Bar Foundation have also launched 
a lawyer regulation reform initiative that is connected to a global network.118 




initiative’s National Advisory Council includes significant personnel crossover 
with other initiatives, which ensures that the individuals involved in this Chicago 
initiative are familiar with developments in other countries.119 Thus, the Chicago 
initiative, like the Arizona, Utah, and California law reform initiatives, provides 
an additional opportunity for lawyer regulation stakeholders to be directly or indi-
rectly exposed to the conversations taking place in global lawyer regulation 
networks. 
Two groups that have promoted recent regulatory reform initiatives also have 
global connections. The first of these groups is the Institute for the Advancement 
of the American Legal System (“IAALS”), which sponsored an April 2019 work-
shop entitled, “Making History: Unlocking Legal Regulation.”120 
See IAALS, Making History: Unlocking Legal Regulation (Apr. 16–17, 2019), in Breakout Panel #9: 
Considering the Future of Rule 5.4: 45th ABA National Conf. on Prof. Responsibility, 243–72, https://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2019_cpr_meetings/2019conf/Materials/ 
breakout9-complete-materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM3M-NTH7] (containing the April 2019 Workshop 
agenda and attendee bios). 
The Workshop 
attendees included members of the Arizona, California, and Utah reform initia-
tives, as well as individuals familiar with the legal services reforms in other coun-
tries.121 
See id. at 245–46; see also Lucy Ricca, UK Legal Service Reforms Under the Legal Services Act 
(2007): A Brief Overview, http://www.utcourts.gov/utc/rulespc/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2019/02/Summary- 
of-Legal-Services-Act-and-ABS-regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9ND-8KPH] (circulated by the Utah RPC 
Committee for its April 15, 2019 meeting). Ms. Ricca, who is a Special Projects Advisor for IAALS and a Fellow 
of the Stanford Law School Center on the Legal Profession, was also a member of the Utah Work Group on 




119. Id. Advisory Council members include Bridget Gramme, a member of the California ATILS Task 
Force, and Lynda Shely, who is a member of the Arizona Task Force, and Arthur Lachman. Id. Lachman co- 
chairs the APRL Future of Lawyering Committee described infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
120. 
121. 
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Regulatory Reform. See Utah Work Group Report, supra note 109, at 2–3 (identifying Ms. Ricca as a member 
of the Utah Work Group); Members of the Task Force: Lucy Ricca, UTAH IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE ON 
REGULATORY REFORM, https://sandbox.utcourts.gov/about#LucyRicca [https://perma.cc/8Z72-MJEJ] (providing 
a biography of Ms. Ricca with these details). 
Knowledge Center” webpage that includes links to regulatory provisions and 
resources from around the United States and from other countries.122 
APRL is the second group that has participated in regulatory reform conversa-
tions and that is part of a global network.123 
See generally The Future of Lawyering, ASSOC. OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, https://aprl.net/ 
aprl-future-of-the-legal-profession-special-committee/ [https://perma.cc/2J8U-CCSL] (last visited Apr. 9, 
2020). 
As Section II.B explained,124 APRL’s 
“Future of Lawyering” Committee, which meets virtually and is working on 
developing reform proposals, includes individuals from Australia, Canada, and 
England who share information about developments and perspectives in their 
countries.125 
Law reform initiatives related to regulatory objectives provide additional 
examples of the impact of global networks. When the United Kingdom adopted a 
new Legal Services Act in 2007, “regulatory objectives” were included as 
Section 1 in that Act.126 Stakeholders in the United States and elsewhere took 
note of these developments and recommended that their jurisdictions also adopt 
regulatory objectives.127 In 2016, upon the recommendation of the ABA 
Commission on the Future of Legal Services, the ABA adopted Resolution 105, 
which encourages state supreme courts to adopt regulatory objectives.128 
ABA Resolution 105: ABA Model Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services (adopted 
Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.abajournal.com/files/2016_hod_midyear_105.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BKM2-CH3K].
The 
Supreme Courts of Colorado, Illinois, and Washington have now adopted regula-
tory objectives; other supreme courts or their delegated bodies are studying this 
issue.129 
See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, Selected Examples of Regulatory Objectives (Mar. 2, 2019), https://works. 
bepress.com/laurel_terry/89/ [https://perma.cc/JN3D-Q4QV] (contains the substance of these regulatory 
objectives, as well as links to the source); Utah Work Group Report, supra note 109, at 15–17 (report adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court endorsed the development of a new regulator whose approach, inter alia, would be 
“driven by clearly articulated policy objectives and regulatory principles (objectives-based regulation)”); State 
Bar of Michigan, 21st Century Law—Regulatory Hurdles, https://www.michbar.org/future/regulation [https:// 
perma.cc/5JJJ-5D92] (“First Steps . . . [u]se formally-adopted regulatory objectives as a tool to rigorously 
evaluate the effectiveness of current and proposed regulatory measures.”). 
Proactive management-based regulation (“PMBR”) provides the final example 
discussed in this Section. In 2010, an Australian academic and two Australian  
122. See IAALS, Unlocking Regulation Knowledge Center, supra note 120. 
123. 
124. See supra notes 74–85 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra note 76. 
126. Legal Services Act, supra note 8, § 1. 
127. See, e.g., Adopting Regulatory Objectives, supra note 25; Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 
763 (“In my view, U.S. jurisdictions should adopt explicit regulatory objectives that set forth what they are try-
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regulators published an article that has sparked global interest in PMBR.130 Their 
article discussed New South Wales’ required self-assessment process for firms 
that chose to practice as an incorporated legal practice (“ILP”) and reported the 
results of an empirical study that found a dramatic reduction of client complaints 
after implementation of the self-assessment process.131 In the United States, an ad 
hoc group of lawyer regulation stakeholders, including regulators from the U.S., 
Canada, and Australia, held several workshops devoted to PMBR.132 
See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, When it Comes to Lawyers . . . Is an Ounce of Prevention Worth a Pound of 
Cure?, JOTWELL (July 13, 2016), https://legalpro.jotwell.com/when-it-comes-to-lawyers-is-an-ounce-of- 
prevention-worth-a-pound-of-cure/ [https://perma.cc/E9MF-ZBMC] (reviewing Susan Saab Fortney, 
Promoting Public Protection through an “Attorney Integrity” System, 23 PROF. LAW. 16 (2015)) (citing the 
first and second Workshops). The author has personal knowledge that the ad-hoc group is planning another 
workshop. 
In January 
2017, the Illinois Supreme Court amended its Rule 756 to require lawyers who do 
not carry malpractice insurance to complete “a self-assessment of the operation 
of his or her law practice.”133 
Order Amending Rule 756, Ill. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 2017), https://courts.illinois.gov/SupremeCourt/Rules/ 
Amend/2017/012517_756.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUR5-DUR5].
The self-assessment is provided online by the 
Illinois’ lawyer regulatory body known as the ARDC.134 
Id; see also ARDC’s Management Based Regulation Learning Site, ILL. ATT’Y REG. & DISCIPLINARY 
COMM’N, https://www.iardc.org/pmbr.html [https://perma.cc/CM63-6PEW] (includes links and learning 
modules, free to all); Illinois Supreme Court Adopts ‘Proactive Management-based Regulation,’ ILL. B. NEWS 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.isba.org/barnews/2017/01/25/illinois-supreme-court-adopts-proactive-management- 
based-regulation [https://perma.cc/6VE8-CWUW] (includes background about the adoption of Illinois’ PMBR 
program). 
The Colorado Supreme 
Court Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel has also embraced PMBR: It has 
developed a series of voluntary PMBR checklists and self-assessment forms for 
lawyers in different kinds of practice settings.135 
See COLO. SUP. CT. OFFICE OF ATT’Y REG. COUNSEL, Colorado Lawyer Self-Assessment Program 
Checklists, http://www.coloradosupremecourt.us/AboutUs/PMBRMinutes.asp [https://perma.cc/J2TH-J8YK]; 
see also Jonathan P. White, Self-Assessment Program Aims to Enhance Lawyer Competency and Client 
Satisfaction, 46 COLO. LAWYER 10 (Oct. 2017) (contains information about the development of Colorado’s 
program), http://www.coloradosupremecourt.us/PDF/AboutUs/PMBR/Law%20Practice%20Management%20% 
20CO%20Lawyer%20Self%20Assessment%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y3M-FBGJ].
In August 2019, the American 
Bar Association adopted Resolution 107 that urged state supreme courts to 
explore PMBR.136 
ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION AND REPORT 107 (adopted Aug. 2019), https://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/annual-2019/107-annual-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JZN- 
JR26].
Professor Susan Fortney’s Georgetown Symposium article 
130. See Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management, 37 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 466, 485 (2010); see also Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 730–36. Terry’s article explains that 
Canadian regulators were among the first to act on Australian data. Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 
730–36. After conducting a pilot project and issuing several reports, Nova Scotia adopted a profession-wide manda-
tory self-assessment program (although they do not call their programs PMBR). Id. British Columbia, Ontario, and 
the Prairie Provinces have been exploring self-assessment projects that would help prevent lawyer problems and are 
at different stages in the process. Id. 
131. Parker et al., supra note 130. On average, the complaint rate (average number of complaints per practi-
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describes some of the additional ongoing efforts.137 As her article and other 
articles have shown, PMBR provides a prime example of the impact of global 
networks on law reform initiatives and lawyer regulation stakeholders.138 
The prior paragraphs have focused on U.S. law reform initiatives that collected 
information from outside the United States. It is worth noting, however, that 
global information travels in both directions—it can come into the United States, 
as the prior examples illustrate, but information can also flow from the United 
States to other countries. Thus, law reform efforts in other countries may also pro-
mote global connections and networks.139 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the ways in which U.S. lawyer regulation has influ-
enced lawyer regulation elsewhere. A November 2019 example highlights the flow of information from the 
United States to Canada. In 2012, the ABA adopted a new comment to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 
that explains that competent representation requires that lawyers understand the risks and benefits of technol-
ogy. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REVISED RESOLUTION 105A AS AMENDED 3–4 (adopted 2012), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120808_revised_resolution_105a_ 
as_amended.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DYR-ZQMN] (the comment number was changed by a later amendment to 
Rule 1.1). In October 2019, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada added a similar provision to its model 
code. See FED. L. SOC’YS CANADA, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 3.1-2[4A], https://flsc.ca/wp- 
content/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU86-74KH]. The author has 
personal knowledge that during a November 2019 conference in Canada, a Canadian regulator referred to the 
ABA Model Rule when explaining the new Canadian model rule to the largely Canadian audience. Additional 
examples of global lawyer regulation stakeholder engagement include the capacity building initiatives of groups 
such as the International Bar Association, the American Bar Association, and the CCBE and European Lawyers’ 
Foundation, among others. See, e.g., Levin et al., The Impact of International Lawyer Organizations on Lawyer 
Regulation, supra note 1, at 427–28. 
Federal law reform conversations, as well as state law reform initiatives, ex-
pose U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders to the views of those who participate in 
global networks. Consider, for example, the issue of how to apply anti-money 
laundering (“AML”) standards to U.S. lawyers.140 There are global networks that 
promote AML standards and that urge U.S. federal lawmakers to adopt more 
stringent AML legislation governing lawyers.141 U.S. lawyer regulation stake-
holders are exposed to these global views through their interactions with U.S. fed-
eral government officials, through conversations with their counterparts in other 
countries, and as a result of information they receive from the domestic 
137. Susan Fortney, Keeping Lawyers’ Houses Clean: Global Innovations to Advance Public Protection 
and the Integrity of the Legal Profession, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891 (2020). 
138. Professor Fortney is a leading expert on PMBR and her Symposium article, id., includes cites to addi-
tional articles, including those that report the results of her empirical research. For additional articles that 
address PMBR and proactive regulation, see Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management-Based 
Regulation to Improve Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 238–51 
(2013) (discussing Australia’s experience with PMBR); Terry, Proactive Regulation, supra note 5, at 724–54 
(discussing global examples of proactive lawyer regulation, including many details about the development of 
Nova Scotia’s proactive regulation program). 
139. 
140. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry & José Carlos Llerena Robles, The Relevance of FATF’s Recommendations 
and 4th Round of Mutual Evaluations to the Legal Profession, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 627, 722 (2018) 
(describing U.S. involvement in the intergovernmental organization called the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)); Terry, US Legal Profession AML Efforts, supra note 19. 
141. See infra notes 142–46. 
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organizations to which they belong.142 
See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/gatekeeper/ [https://perma.cc/H989-CT6C] (including policy letters 
that demonstrate the interaction among lawyer regulation stakeholders and U.S. government and FATF 
officials); AM. COLLEGE OF TRUSTS & ESTATES COUNSEL, Combatting Money Laundering; FATF and the 
Lawyer’s Role, https://www.actec.org/resources/fatf-and-the-lawyers-role/ [https://perma.cc/S6E7-8VKQ] 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2020); Terry & Robles, supra note 140, at 676–77 (describing U.S. legal profession 
interactions with U.S. Department of the Treasury officials and subsequent education efforts); see also Duncan 
Osborne, The Financial Action Task Force and the Legal Profession, 59 N.Y.L. SCH L. REV. 421, 422–23 
(2015) (describing his involvement with the FATF private sector consultation group). The author has personal 
knowledge that the ABA Task Force cited above currently includes a lawyer regulator from Georgia who is 
also active in the National Organization of Bar Counsel and thus can share with state regulators the information 
she learns from the globally-connected AML networks. 
The resulting AML discussions have led to 
developments that affect U.S. lawyers (although some suggest that much more 
stringent requirements are called for).143 The changes include, inter alia, 
Geographic Targeting Orders (“GTOs”) designed to inhibit money laundering, 
ethics opinions reminding lawyers of their AML obligations, education efforts, and 
proposed rule changes.144 
See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN Reissues Real Estate Geographic 
Targeting Orders for 12 Metropolitan Areas (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen- 
reissues-real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-12-metropolitan-areas-0 [https://perma.cc/7B47-3ZH9]; Terry & 
Robles, supra note 140, at 689–90; Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 
2018-4: Duties When an Attorney Is Asked to Assist in a Suspicious Transaction (2018), https://www.nycbar.org/ 
member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/formal-opinion-2018-4-duties-when-an- 
attorney-is-asked-to-assist-in-a-suspicious-transaction [https://perma.cc/AQ3F-ARKH]; ABA, Formal Op. 
491: Obligations Under Rule 1.2(d) to Avoid Counseling or Assisting in a Crime or Fraud in Non-Litigation 
Settings (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/ 
aba-formal-opinion-491.pdf [https://perma.cc/54FW-2SRG]. The author has personal knowledge that a 
committee-developed AML-related ethics rule change has been submitted to the State Bar of Georgia Board of 
Governors for its consideration. 
Despite the GTOs and heighted educational efforts, the 
U.S. has been heavily criticized by those inside and outside the country for its fail-
ure to more strictly regulate U.S. lawyer AML efforts.145 
See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-TERRORIST 
FINANCING MEASURES, UNITED STATES, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT 11 ¶ 30(3)(b) (Dec. 2016), http://www. 
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB8S-BNS6]. 
FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report for the United States recommended as one of its “priority actions” that the 
United States “[a]pply appropriate [anti-moneylaundering] obligations . . . on the basis of a specific 
vulnerability analysis, to lawyers . . . .” Id; see also Nougayrède, supra note 143, at 331–42 (criticizing U.S. 
legal profession AML efforts); Terry & Robles, supra note 140, at 638–641, 707–08 (discussing the domestic 
and global critiques of U.S. legal profession AML efforts). 
These kinds of globally- 
influenced conversations may have been one of the reasons why, in 2019, for the 
first time ever, the U.S. House of Representatives (but not the Senate) passed a bill 
that required disclosure of corporate beneficial ownership information.146 
See H.R. 2513, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house- 
bill/2513/text/eh [https://perma.cc/7D5W-JGMF] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). This bill would amend the Bank 
Secrecy Act. It proposes to add a new § 5333(a)(1)(A) that states that “[e]ach applicant to form a corporation or 
limited liability company under the laws of a State or Indian Tribe shall file a report with FinCEN containing a 
142. 
143. See generally Terry, US Legal Profession AML Efforts, supra note 19 (describing U.S. education and 
other efforts); Delphine Nougayrède, Anti-Money Laundering and Lawyer Regulation: The Response of the 
Professions, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 321 (2019) (criticizing the U.S. legal profession for its AML efforts and 
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list of the beneficial owners of the corporation or limited liability company [that meets certain requirements].” 
Id. Section 5333(d)(1) defines an “applicant” as “any natural person who files an application to form a corpora-
tion or limited liability company under the laws of a State or Indian Tribe.” Id. This bill, which was not adopted 
by the Senate, arguably would have applied to lawyers, but might have been challenged on legal grounds. Cf. 
ABA v. FTC, 636 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing as moot the FTC’s appeal of a district court decision 
that found in favor of the ABA and enjoined enforcement of a “red flags” rule against lawyers, in light of subse-
quent clarifying legislation). See also Press Release, Global Witness, Historic Bipartisan Bill To End 
Anonymous Companies Passes U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.globalwitness.org/ 
en/press-releases/historic-bipartisan-bill-end-anonymous-companies-passes-us-house-representatives/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D2AP-C2EY]. For additional information about why beneficial ownership regulation is relevant to 
lawyer regulation, see Terry & Robles, supra note 140, at 689–90 (“Because of the manner in which lawyer 
AML obligations and substantive corporate disclosure laws related to beneficial ownership have been 
intertwined in FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports and public discussions, [beneficial ownership scandals] are 
likely to create additional pressure in the United States for lawyer regulation reform.”). 
Although international trade discussions are not typically characterized as 
“law reform initiatives,” conversations among the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the ABA Standing 
Committee on International Trade in Legal Services illustrate the degree to which 
global information and global perspectives have shaped initiatives that have law-
yer regulation implications. For example, in 2015, after citing international trade 
negotiations, the Conference of Chief Justices (“CCJ”) adopted a resolution that 
encouraged all state supreme courts to adopt rules that would allow foreign law-
yers to practice in their state on a limited basis.147 
Resolution 2, In Support of Regulations Permitting Limited Practice by Foreign Lawyers in the United 
States to Address Issues Arising from Legal Market Globalization and Cross-Border Legal Practice, CONF. OF 
CHIEF JUSTICES (Jan. 28, 2015), https://ccj.ncsc.org/�/media/microsites/files/ccj/resolutions/01282015-legal- 
market-globalization.ashx [https://perma.cc/G76P-PJ3M]. This resolution stated that the CCJ “strongly 
encourages its members to adopt explicit policies that permit qualified activities by foreign lawyers as a means 
to increase available legal services, and to facilitate the movement of goods and services between the United 
States and foreign nations.” Id. 
The CCJ group that prepared 
this resolution regularly confers with representatives from the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative and with foreign, as well as U.S., stakeholders.148 Since the 
adoption of this CCJ resolution, a number of state supreme courts have changed 
their rules that regulate foreign lawyers.149 
See, e.g., ABA CNTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, State by State Adoption of Selected Ethics 20/20 
Commission Policies, Guidelines for an International Regulatory Information Exchange, and Amendment to 
Model Rule 8.4 (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_ 
responsibility/state_implementation_selected_e20_20_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND9J-37UU] (showing state 
adoption of some of the foreign lawyer rules). 
This CCJ Resolution is one of many 
different international trade examples that might have been cited to illustrate the 
global context of federal “law reform” initiatives.150 
See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON INT’L TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES, Featured Resources, https:// 
www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/promoting_international_ 
rule_law/internationaltradetf/ [https://perma.cc/S5B6-EN8X] (last visited Apr. 9, 2020) (providing links to 
documents that show the ABA Standing Committee’s involvement on international trade issues). For 
additional information about ABA international trade-related activities and the impact of global networks on 
lawyer regulation stakeholder conversations, one can consult the ABA Transnational Legal Practice 
Committee “Year-in-Review” reports. For links to these reports from 2002–2016, select “Transnational 
Moreover, there are other 
147. 
148. The author has personal knowledge of this fact. 
149. 
150. 
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Legal Practice Year-in-Review Articles” from the “Jump to Category” menu available at https://works.bepress. 
com/laurel_terry/.
kinds of federal initiatives, beyond international trade discussions, that poten-
tially could affect lawyer regulation and that reflect or include global 
perspectives.151 
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, Evidence-Based Lawyer Regulation, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 335–49 
(2019) (suggesting, inter alia, that state lawyer regulation adapt to the federal [and international] trend of 
requiring evidence-based regulation); Laurel S. Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the 
Practice of Law in a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2903, 2905–06 (2014) (noting the way in which 
global discussions about the scope of the legal profession’s monopoly have appeared in U.S. lawyer regulation- 
international trade discussions); Laurel S. Terry, The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in 
Professional Services, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 5–7, 92, (2009) (citing U.S. involvement in global conver-
sations about antitrust law and lawyer regulation and citing U.S. Department of Justice efforts to restrict state 
lawyer regulations it viewed as anti-competitive); Levin et al., supra note 1, at 427–28 (describing various 
ABA-federal government initiatives); see also Amy Salyzyn, Building Better Lawyer Regulators, JOTWELL 
(Dec. 6, 2019), https://legalpro.jotwell.com/building-better-lawyer-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/Y2FL-5LEU] 
(reviewing Chambliss, supra note 13); Levin et al., supra note 1, at 410 (noting how the IBA, ABA, and CCBE 
worked together to respond after the “Troika” of the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and 
European Commission insisted on regulatory reform of the Irish legal profession as a condition of their 
assistance). 
Lawyer regulation initiatives from international groups, such as the 
International Bar Association (“IBA”), also connect U.S. lawyer regulation stake-
holders to global networks and conversations. For example, the IBA has drawn 
upon the resources of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility when 
working on projects such as the commentary to accompany the IBA professional 
code152 
See, e.g., INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession 
Approved on 25 May 2019 by the Council of the International Bar Association (2019), [https://perma.cc/ 
CBR7-HZCP] (opens a PDF document). The second page of this document states: “The IBA wishes to thank 
the following for their contribution to the International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession . . . Co- 
opted member Ellyn Rosen (USA).” Id. The author has personal knowledge that Ms. Rosen is a long-time staff 
lawyer for the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility. See also Levin et al., supra note 1, at 414–18 
(documenting additional ways in which the International Bar Association has brought together lawyer 
regulation stakeholders). 
and the IBA’s adoption of guidelines regarding regulatory cooperation.153 
See, e.g., ABA Res. 104 (adopted Aug. 12–13, 2013), [https://perma.cc/H7C7-G9DX] (adopting a 
resolution that set forth and recommended its Guidelines for an International Regulatory Information 
Exchange). After the ABA adopted its resolution, the International Bar Association adopted similar guidelines. 
INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA Guidelines for an International Regulatory Information Exchange Regarding 
Disciplinary Sanctions against Lawyers (May 2017), [https://perma.cc/BGY4-WKRX] (opens PDF 
document). See also Levin et al., supra note 1, at 435–51 (describing the cooperation and competition among 
the ABA, IBA, and CCBE on efforts relating to lawyer regulation). 
Because the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility plays a central role in 
bringing together U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders through its annual confer-
ences and its extensive resources,154 
See, e.g., supra notes 55–61 (describing the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility’s annual 
ethics conference); ABA CENTER FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Policy & Initiatives, https://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ [https://perma.cc/2ZD3-FALB] (last visited Apr. 22 2020) 
(providing links to numerous U.S. ethics resources, which are extensively used by many lawyer regulation 
stakeholders); see also Terry, Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics, supra note 33, at 119 (citing 
as the ABA’s strengths its 1) its ability to serve as an information aggregator; 2) its role as a network facilitator; 
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networks has ripple effects throughout the U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholder 
community. 
The IBA’s November 2019 circulation of a consultation paper about proposed 
IBA principles on the provision of unregulated legal services also illustrates U.S. 
stakeholders’ connections to global conversations.155 
See, e.g., Consultation Paper from the Bar Issues Comm’n of the Int’l Bar Ass’n, Unregulated 
Providers of Legal Services (Nov. 2019), [https://perma.cc/VC7L-3L7S] [hereinafter IBA Consultation Paper]; 
Email from Jonathan Goldsmith, Chair, IBA Committee on Guidelines for Unregulated Providers of Legal 
Services to Laurel S. Terry (and others) (Nov. 12, 2019) (on file with author) (“Dear colleagues, This is just to 
bring to your attention that the consultation of IBA member bars on our document was sent out yesterday by 
the IBA office, and is copied below.”). This Consultation Paper and responses are expected to become the basis 
for an IBA report. See Email from Jonathan Goldsmith, Chair, IBA Committee on Guidelines for Unregulated 
Providers of Legal Services to Laurel S. Terry (and others) (June 4, 2020) (on file with author). 
This consultation paper 
addressed, inter alia, issues that arise in connection with artificial intelligence and 
technology-provided legal services.156 This paper was circulated to the IBA’s 
Member Bars, which include the American Bar Association, the State Bar of 
Michigan, and the State Bar of California,157 
See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, Membership Organisations, https://www.ibanet.org/Member 
shipOrganisations/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/4V74-54ZJ] (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 
the last of which has been particu-
larly interested in issues related to whether and how to regulate the use of AI and 
technology in the delivery of legal services.158 U.S. stakeholders confronting arti-
ficial intelligence-legal services issues undoubtedly will find it helpful to consult 
the global resources cited by the IBA.159 
In sum, because regulators in different countries are likely to face similar regu-
latory issues,160 legal services reform initiatives inside the United States trigger 
cross-border comparisons, conversations, and networks. Moreover, the participa-
tion of U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders in law reform discussions and initia-
tives outside the United States helps foster and deepen the global connections 
3) its ability to speak for more U.S. lawyers than any other organization, given the occasional request from U.S. 
governmental bodies and others to hear about the views of “the U.S. legal profession;” and 4) its ability to bring 
together a relatively diverse group of stakeholders). 
155. 
156. IBA Consultation Paper, supra note 155. 
157. 
158. See supra note 105 for a link to the California ATILS Task Force. Its initial recommendations included 
some developed by its Artificial Intelligence/Unauthorized Practice of Law Subcommittee. Id. Although the 
Task Force’s March 2020 Final Report did not include an AI-specific recommendation, the regulatory sandbox 
work group is likely to consider these kinds of issues. See generally supra note 105 (citing the Final Report and 
May 2020 vote to establish a regulatory sandbox work group). 
159. The IBA Consultation Paper, supra note 155, cited, inter alia, a European Commission document enti-
tled “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI,” a 2018 report by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (“FRA”) on 
the topic of “BigData” and discrimination in data-supported decision making; a December 2018 document 
called the European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their 
Environment, which was prepared by a working group of the European Council body called the European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (“CEPEJ”); and a June 2019 Law Society of England and Wales 
report regarding “The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice system.” IBA Consultation Paper, supra note 
155, at 4–7. 
160. See, e.g., supra notes 130–38 (discussing PMBR); see also Laurel S. Terry et al., Trends and 
Challenges in Lawyer Regulation: The Impact of Globalization and Technology, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2661 
(2012). 
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among lawyer regulation stakeholder networks. Thus, even if they are not 
conscious of this fact, anyone who follows U.S. lawyer regulation reform initia-
tives is likely exposed to, and indirectly connected to, global networks and 
conversations. 
E. MEMBERSHIP IN “DOMESTIC” GROUPS THAT LIKELY INCLUDE GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
The prior paragraphs provided examples of the global information sharing that 
takes place through in-person meetings, virtual meetings, legal literature, and law 
reform initiatives. This Section focuses on the global information sharing that can 
occur through the groups to which U.S. lawyers belong, many of which might, at 
first glance, seem to be wholly domestic. 
Most lawyers presumably belong to at least one, and probably many, different 
groups that might be described as affiliation networks or groups.161 Lawyers in 
private practice might work for a law firm that has a network of offices through-
out the country or the world.162 Alternatively, or in addition, a lawyer in private 
practice might work for a law firm that belongs to a domestic or global network of 
law firms.163 Many lawyers in private practice belong to a bar association group 
or another kind of affinity organization for lawyers.164 Government lawyers, 
in-house counsel, and lawyers who work for other entities, such as non-profit 
organizations, are similarly likely to belong to at least one, and likely multiple, 
affiliation groups.165 
Despite the seemingly “domestic” nature of many of the groups to which U.S. 
lawyers belong, global perspectives and issues are likely to creep into these 
“domestic” networks, whether in listserv conversations, magazine articles, the 
occasional meeting topic, or otherwise.166 Law review articles and other sources 
show the broad contexts in which global issues can arise, including in practice 
settings that might, at first glance, seem to involve “domestic” issues.167 The wide 
161. NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 60 (describing an affiliation network as a network in which 
actors are connected via their membership in groups of some kind). Network experts sometimes express these 
as bipartite representation, in which the edges or connecting lines they draw do not connect individuals directly 
to one another, but instead connect individuals to groups. See id. at 61. 
162. See Terry, Global Networks, supra note 1, at 163–64. 
163. See id. at 164–66. 
164. See id. at 159–60. 
165. See id. at 167–69. 
166. The author has encountered this in all of the groups with which she is connected, even though some of 
the groups she belongs to involve topics such as Civil Procedure or Pennsylvania legal ethics that might not 
obviously strike one as involving “global” issues. 
167. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study “Transnational” Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 97, 98–99 (2011) (citing numerous “hypotheticals” that raise global issues, many of which are based on 
actual situations or cases); Susan L. DeJarnatt & Mark C. Rahdert, Preparing for Globalized Law Practice: The 
Need To Include International And Comparative Law In The Legal Writing Curriculum, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING 
INST. 3, 19–20 (2011) (finding in a survey of Philadelphia Bar Association that 67.5% of those responding had 
worked on a matter in the past five years that required them to “know something about foreign and/or 
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international law,” even though only 3.4% described their primary geographic client base as “international”); 
Ronit Dinovitzer et al., The Am. Bar Found. & The NALP Found. For Law Career Research and Educ., After 
the J.D. II: Second Results from a National Study of Legal Careers 35 (2009), http://www. 
americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/ajd2_final_for_distribution.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8ML- 
TVH3] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020) (finding that 44% of the surveyed lawyers had done at least some work that 
involved clients from outside the United States). 
range of substantive law areas covered by the ABA Section of International 
Law’s committees suggests that international issues can arise in virtually every 
substantive area of the law.168 Thus, because foreign or international law issues 
can arise in almost any substantive law area, these issues are likely to periodically 
spill over into listserv messages, journal articles, and other activities of what 
might be thought to be purely “domestic” affiliation groups. Moreover, as the 
number of individuals who participate in both domestic and global networks 
expands, the diffusion of global perspectives increases. The Section that follows 
elaborates on this point. 
III. DIFFUSION, TIPPING POINTS, AND GLOBAL NETWORKS OF LAWYER 
REGULATION STAKEHOLDERS 
There are many different sources one could cite and terminology that one 
might use in order to convey the idea that diffusion matters and that tipping points 
exist. Infectious disease epidemics, for example, typically go through three stages 
that begin with a slow-growth phase, which is then followed by an explosive 
phase, and the burnout phase.169 On the other side of the health spectrum, if a suf-
ficient percentage of the population obtains a vaccination, then a “herd effect” 
occurs that helps protect those who have not been vaccinated.170 
See, e.g., Francis L. Black, The Role of Herd Immunity in Control of Measles, 55 YALE J. BIOL. MED. 
351 (1982); Fengchen Liu, et al., The Role Of Vaccination Coverage, Individual Behaviors, And The Public 
Health Response In The Control Of Measles Epidemics: An Agent-Based Simulation For California, 15 BMC 
PUB. HEALTH 447 (2015); see also Aimee Cunningham, How Holes In Herd Immunity Led To A 25-Year High 
In U.S. Measles Cases, SCI. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/holes-herd-immunity- 
led-25-year-high-us-measles-cases [https://perma.cc/Y9CK-QGW2]. Network experts are likely to refer to this 
as percolation. See, e.g., NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 570 (“Another example of a percolation 
process is the vaccination or immunization of individuals against the spread of disease.”). 
Scholars have 
written about the concept of “critical mass” in settings as varied as the adoption 
168. See Terry, Global Networks, supra note 1, at 161 (describing these committees). I sometimes challenge 
the students in my required first-year Practicing Law in a Global World: Contexts and Competencies course to 
“stump” me by coming up with an area of law where there are no foreign or international issues. They rarely 
can, and when they do, I usually conclude that it is due to my lack of exposure, rather than the lack of issues. 
169. See, e.g., DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 170–73 (W.W. 
Norton & Co. ed., 2004). Although the Watts book is more than fifteen years old, it provides a useful introduc-
tion to the subject and is accessible to the nonexpert. See also NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 607–74 
(examining the mathematical techniques that allow one to understand and predict the outcomes of epidemics 
given the connections between network structure and disease dynamics). This Section of the Article was written 
during and before December 2019, when COVID-19 was not yet widespread and the phrase “flattening the 
curve” was not yet commonplace. See supra note 68 (citing WHO and CDC COVID-19 websites). I suspect 
that most readers now have a heightened appreciation of the power of networks and impact of exponential 
growth. 
170. 
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of electric vehicles,171 collective bargaining,172 platform businesses,173 
David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform Businesses 
(2010), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1353502 [https://perma.cc/PZU7-5K96] (last visited Apr. 23, 
2020). 
cancer 
research,174 and corporate boardroom diversity,175 although a leading contempo-
rary network science textbook does not include the term “critical mass.”176 
This Article will not provide a “deep dive” into network science nor will it 
examine for lawyer regulation stakeholders the variables that network experts 
likely would use to analyze the reach and impact of lawyer regulation stakeholder 
networks.177 Nevertheless, when seeking to understand global networks and the 
diffusion of information, it is helpful to be familiar with what network experts 
call the “small-world” effect.178 Although law review readers may not be familiar 
with the original “small-world” experiment conducted by Stanley Milgram, they 
may be familiar with the phrase “six degrees of separation,” the play entitled “Six 
Degrees of Separation,” or the game called “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon,” in 
which one tries to connect actor Kevin Bacon to any actor in the world by citing 
six or fewer movies; all of these use language that can be traced to Stanley 
Milgram’s original “small-world” experiment.179 
See, e.g., WATTS, supra note 169, at 38–39 (noting that Milgram’s experiment became the basis for the 
phrase “six degrees of separation” which was thereafter used as the title of John Guare’s 1990 “Six Degrees of 
Separation” play, as well as parlor games); Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Six_Degrees_of_Kevin_Bacon [https://perma.cc/8ER3-9MFW] (last visited June 3, 2020) (explaining the 
game “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon”); M. E. J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45 
SIAM [SOC’Y FOR INDUSTRIAL AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS] REV. 167, 175 (2003) (“two actors are considered 
connected if they have appeared in a film together.”); see also NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 63 
(noting that Milgram’s study “is the origin of the idea of the ‘six degrees of separation,’ the popular belief that 
there are only about six steps between any two people in the world.”). 
Although experts have critiqued 
Milgram’s methodology, later research suggests that the conclusions were sound 
and that two unrelated individuals are generally able to connect to each other in 
171. See Yiyi Zhou & Shanjun Li, Technology Adoption and Critical Mass: The Case of the U.S. Electric 
Vehicle Market, 66 J. INDUS. ECON. 423 (2018). 
172. See GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge 
U. Press 1993). 
173. 
174. See, e.g., Fabien Calvo et. al., Cancer Core Europe: A European Cancer Research Alliance Realizing 
A Research Infrastructure With Critical Mass And Programmatic Approach To Cure Cancer In The 21st 
Century, 103 EUR. J. CANCER 155 (2018). 
175. See, e.g., Lissa L. Broome, et. al., Does Critical Mass Matter? Views From the Boardroom, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049 (2011); Jasmin Joecks, et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a ‘Critical Mass’?, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61 (2013). 
176. See, e.g., NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 751–80 (excluding this phrase from the index of this 
leading textbook); see also WATTS, supra note 169, at 363–74 (referring briefly to a critical point, but not a crit-
ical mass). 
177. Cf. NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 608 (observing that “ideas and models for the spread of dis-
ease can be usefully applied to help us understand the spread of information.”). As many of us observed during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, there can be daily changes in scientific models about networks and the spread of dis-
ease (or information). 
178. See, e.g., NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 62–65 (discussing experiments related to the “small- 
world” effect); see also WATTS, supra note 169, at 32 (referring to this as the “small world problem.”). 
179. 
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five to seven steps.180 As one expert has explained, “the fundamental conclusion that 
[two individuals] tend on average to be connected by short paths is now widely 
accepted.”181 Moreover, the “small-world” effect is not limited to social networks; it 
is widespread and has been studied both empirically and mathematically.182 
In order to illustrate the implications of this research and the impact that net-
works can have on lawyers, it is instructive to consider the situation of a lawyer 
who practiced in the United Kingdom. This lawyer used his work email to for-
ward to six friends an email he had received from a woman.183 Within a matter of 
days, this email had been forwarded to seven million readers.184 This lawyer was 
later disciplined for using his work email for personal purposes.185 This example 
shows how networks serve to amplify and diffuse information. Although individ-
uals may have become more savvy about how messages can go viral, I suspect 
that most lawyers may not fully appreciate how an email sent to six people can 
travel around the world in a matter of days. 
Recent events have demonstrated the impact of networks and the concept of 
exponential growth. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many undoubtedly were 
following the WHO and CDC COVID-19 dashboards that showed how quickly 
an outbreak could go “viral” and infect the world. Global developments in the 
lawyer regulation field have obviously not travelled around the world as quickly 
as COVID-19186 or the email in the prior paragraph, but the past five to ten years 
have shown an impressive amount of global diffusion. Lawyer regulation 
ideas that have been adopted elsewhere in the world—such as mandatory mal-
practice insurance, regulatory objectives, PMBR, nonlawyer providers, and non-
lawyer ownership—have become a regular part of U.S. lawyer regulation 
180. NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 63–64 (indicating that Milgram’s study should be taken with a 
large pinch of salt because of methodology issues, but noting that a more rigorous 2003 study by Dodds et al. 
found that the average path length to make the study’s required connections was between five and seven steps). 
181. Id. at 10 (noting that that the mean distance between node pairs in many networks is very short, often 
no more than a dozen steps or so, even for networks with millions of nodes). Professor Newman has explained 
that the conclusion that node pairs tend to be connected by short paths 
has been confirmed directly in many cases, including for some very large social networks such as 
the entire network of Facebook friends . . . and has moreover been shown to extend to many other 
(non-social kinds) of networks as well. Enough experiments have observed this “small-world 
effect” in enough networks that, whatever misgivings we may have about Milgram’s particular 
technique, the general result is not seriously called into question.  
Id. at 63. 
182. Id. (noting that the fundamental conclusion that node pairs are connected by short paths “has moreover 
been shown to extend to many other (non-social) kinds of networks”); Newman, The Structure and Function of 
Complex Networks, supra note 179, at 175, 183 (citing empirical studies of networks and noting that “the 
small-world effect is also mathematically obvious.”). 
183. WATTS, supra note 169, at 165. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. See WHO COVID-19 Dashboard, supra note 68; CDC Cases in the U.S., supra note 68. 
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conversations.187 Regardless of whether one considers these developments to be pos-
itive or negative,188 they have become part of U.S. lawyer regulation conversations. 
Moreover, if one considers the examples of in-person meetings and virtual 
meetings described in Sections II.A and II.B, supra,189 and then imagines how 
many other stakeholders each of these participants will interact with after having 
been exposed to global lawyer regulation stakeholder perspectives, one can see 
how diffusion can happen within lawyer regulation stakeholder communities. 
Just like an email originally sent to six people ended up in the hands of seven mil-
lion readers within a week—and just as COVID-19 spread around the world—the 
global perspectives that originally were dispersed to a relatively small group of 
individuals will continue to expand and spread throughout the larger lawyer regu-
lation stakeholder community. (In light of these expanding contacts, one can see 
why U.S. and foreign regulators have recently been interested in developing regu-
latory cooperation models.190
See, e.g., IBA Guidelines for an International Regulatory Information Exchange, supra note 153; ABA 
Res. 104, supra note 153. The Conference of Chief Justices has passed resolutions endorsing cooperation with 
the CCBE in Europe and the Law Council of Australia. See, e.g., Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 13: 
In Support of Cooperation Among United States and Australian Bar Admission and Lawyer Disciplinary 
Bodies (Aug. 2009), [https://perma.cc/LBV2-CWN3]; Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 2, In Support 
of Cooperation Among United States and European Disciplinary Bodies (Jan. 2009), [https://perma.cc/V5DX- 
CM5F].
) 
As demonstrated above, there are many places in which lawyer regulation 
stakeholders may connect with global perspectives.191 Network experts might 
refer to these stakeholders as “nodes” and the opportunities as the “edges” that 
connect lawyer regulation stakeholders.192 Although global network opportuni-
ties existed in the past, and although there have been globally-connected stake-
holders for years, if not decades,193 it appears that there are significantly more 
globally-connected “nodes” that U.S. stakeholders are likely to encounter than 
187. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 137, at Parts II-IV (discussing practices in other countries regarding 
PMBR, compensation, and discrimination); Leslie C. Levin, The Politics of Lawyer Regulation: The 
Malpractice Insurance Example, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 969, 973 n.21 (2020) (referring to other countries’ 
practices regarding professional liability insurance); Thirty Years, supra note 1, at n.76 (citing articles that dis-
cussed global conversations regarding nonlawyer ownership and providers, and regulatory objectives); 
Adopting Regulatory Objectives, supra note 25 (citing global regulatory objectives developments). 
188. The author has personal knowledge that there are strong feelings in support of and in opposition to 
most if not all of these developments. 
189. See supra Sections II.A–B for a discussion of the ways in which in-person and virtual meetings connect 
lawyer regulation stakeholders to a global network. 
190. 
 
191. See Part II, supra, which discusses five ways in which lawyer regulation stakeholders can connect to a 
global network—through in-person meetings, virtual meetings, by reading articles, following law reform initia-
tives, or being part of a law-related group that communicates with its members. 
192. Network experts use the term “edge” to refer to some form of connection between individuals in a 
social network. NEWMAN, NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 64. Newman explained that “there are many different 
possible definitions of an edge” in a social network and that the “the particular definition one uses will depend 
on what questions one is interested in answering.” Id.; see also supra note 17. This Article discussed five oppor-
tunities or “edges” that connect U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders or “nodes” to their global counterparts. 
193. See generally Terry, Thirty Years, supra note 1; Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age 
of Global and Comparative Perspectives, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 463 (2005). 
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there were five years ago, and that there are significantly more opportunities or 
“edges” where a U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholder might tap into a global net-
work and connect with global perspectives. 
At this point, it may be worth comparing the current situation to the situation 
approximately five years ago when Professor Carole Silver and this author co- 
wrote a “year-in-review” article about 2014 transnational legal practice develop-
ments.194 That article used the framework of transnational legal practice networks 
(“TLP-Nets”) to discuss the 2014 transnational legal practice “year-in-review” 
developments.195 This 2015 article drew a distinction between nationally-based 
TLP-Nets and transnationally-focused TLP-Nets.196 It observed that although the 
transnational TLP-Nets discussed in the article had been active for several years, 
their 2014 activity suggested that their significance was building.197 That prior ar-
ticle also highlighted the global connections of U.S. lawyer regulation stakehold-
ers, stating that: 
What is noteworthy, however, is the degree to which [the U.S. nationally- 
based TLP-Nets] now interact with international and transnational regulatory 
actors as well as with one another, resulting in cross-fertilization of TLP- 
related terminology, ideas, and initiatives. Each of these organizations was 
involved with transnational legal practice issues in 2014.198 
Despite these sentences acknowledging the global connections of U.S. stake-
holders, the 2015 article is noteworthy because the concluding section on U.S.- 
based TLP-Nets highlighted the overlapping linkages within U.S. stakeholder 
groups.199 
What seems different today, compared to 2015, is the volume of linkages 
among U.S. stakeholder groups and the transnational TLP-Nets identified in that 
article.200 This is particularly noteworthy in the law reform arena. In my view, 
global perspectives and networks have become much more deeply embedded in 
194. See Terry & Silver, supra note 1, at 413. 
195. Id. at 413. 
196. Id. The 2015 article defined nationally-based TLP-Nets as those that “take as their focus the TLP 
agenda of a particular jurisdiction, and necessarily are comprised principally—although not exclusively—of 
actors based in that jurisdiction.” Id. at 416. It defined transnational TLP-Nets as those that “are formed to bring 
together actors from various jurisdictions to generate dialogue and share information.” Id. at 426. The 
nationally-based TLP-Nets section of the article highlighted the 2014 activities of U.S. and European TLP- 
Nets. See id. at 425–26 (describing CCBE activities); id. at 416–25 (describing eleven U.S. developments). The 
transnationally-focused TLP-NETs section of the article focused on the 2014 activities of the International 
Conference of Legal Regulators, the International Bar Association, and the International Association of Legal 
Ethics, as well as informal collaborations among U.S. and Canadian regulators. Id. at 426–30. 
197. Id. at 426. 
198. Id. at 417. 
199. Id. at 425 (the concluding paragraph of the section on U.S.-based TLP-Net observed that “[i]n addition 
to the formal organizational efforts within the ABA, there are numerous linkages among these [ABA] entities, 
including overlaps in membership or staff.”). 
200. Cf. id. at 425 (concluding the section on U.S. TLP Nets by referring to linkages among U.S. domestic 
groups, rather than linkages among U.S. stakeholder groups and transnational networks). 
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U.S. conversations than they were five years ago. There has been a diffusion of 
global perspectives in all five of the settings or “opportunities” previously dis-
cussed: in-person and virtual meetings, legal literature, law reform initiatives, 
and lawyer affiliation networks, including those that are seemingly domestic.201 
One way to think about the spread of global lawyer regulation stakeholder net-
works is to compare this phenomenon to the Rogers Diffusion of Innovations 
curve that has been used to describe the ways new technology spreads through a 
society. The Rogers Diffusion of Innovations curve refers to an idea that was 
originally published in Professor Everett Rogers’ 1962 book Diffusion of 
Innovations. This influential book, which was most recently updated in 2003, 
focuses on how innovation spreads.202 Even those who are aren’t experts are 
likely to have an intuitive sense of the correctness of the Rogers Diffusion of 
Innovation curve. As Professor Bill Henderson has explained, Rogers posited that 
successful innovations progress through a bell curve that involved the actions of 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards.203 Not all 
innovations (or ideas) will make their way through the entire bell curve, how-
ever.204 One of the most perilous stages for an idea or innovation is the transition 
from the “early adopter” stage to the “early majority” stage; those innovations 
that make this transition have been described as “crossing the chasm.”205 
The ideas found in Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations book have been influential 
in a variety of settings. They have been used to explain certain aspects of network 
theory;206 the diffusion of political policy;207 in the health care context;208 to 
explain mathematical models that help companies more effectively target future 
customers;209 and to better understand the circumstances under which legal  
201. See supra Part II discussing these five methods of interaction. 
202. Everett M. Rogers, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (5th ed. 2003). 
203. Henderson, supra note 3, at 401. 
204. Id. at 402–403. 
205. Id. at 432, 458–59 (describing the “crossing the chasm” concept). See generally GEOFFREY A. MOORE, 
CROSSING THE CHASM (3rd ed. 2014) (exploring how and why innovations cross the chasm that often exists 
between the innovation and early adopter stages, on the one hand, and the early majority stage, on the other 
hand). See also WATTS, supra note 169, at 232 (explaining that Rogers’ terminology may be easier to under-
stand than the technical version of the threshold model but noting that Rogers’ “diffusion of innovations” can 
refer to diffusion of ideas or practices, as well as technology). 
206. See, e.g., WATTS, supra note 169, at 232–35. 
207. See, e.g., Diane Stone, Osmany Porto de Oliveira & Leslie A. Pal, Transnational Policy Transfer: the 
Circulation of Ideas, Power and Development Models, 39 POL’Y AND SOC’Y 1 (2019); Todd Makse & Craig 
Volden, The Role of Policy Attributes in the Diffusion of Innovations, 73 J. OF POL. 108 (2011) (“We adopt 
Everett Rogers’(1983, 2004) attribute typology from the diffusion of innovations literature and apply it to a 
sample of 27 policy innovations from the sphere of criminal justice policy in the U.S. states between 1973 and 
2002.”). 
208. James W. Dearing & Jeffrey G. Cox, Diffusion of Innovations Theory, Principles, and Practice, 37 
HEALTH AFF. 183 (2018). 
209. See, e.g., Dorit S. Hochbaum et al., Rating Customers According to Their Promptness to Adopt New 
Products, 59 OPERATIONS RES. 1171 (2011). 
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services innovation might succeed.210 As explained by Professor Bill Henderson 
when applying Rogers’ “Diffusion Curve” ideas to the legal services industry, 
“Rogers’s core insight—one that is absolutely foundational for readers—is that 
the diffusion of innovation is a process that occurs through a social system. . . . 
[T]he social system has five ‘adopter’ segments that fit a normal distribution.”211 
In my view, the examples cited in this Article suggest that the United States has 
“crossed a chasm.”212 U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders now seem firmly em-
bedded within a global network. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined a particular subset of legal profession networks— 
namely, the networks of stakeholders interested in lawyer regulation issues. After 
enumerating many different lawyer regulation stakeholders, including ten categories 
into which these stakeholders might be grouped, this Article identified five ways in 
which lawyer regulation stakeholders can participate—directly or indirectly— 
in global networks. These opportunities include in-person meetings, conferences, 
virtual meetings, law reform initiatives, as a result of reading literature, and as part 
of the information that is delivered by the “domestic” affiliation groups to which 
U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders belong. For each of these five opportunities, this 
Article provided specific examples that illustrate how U.S. lawyer regulation stake-
holders are exposed to global perspectives and networks. These examples demon-
strated how global networks have changed the vocabulary, content, and participants 
involved in lawyer regulation conversations. Given the pervasiveness of these global 
networks, it is important for stakeholders to recognize the degree to which global 
networks and experiences are likely to have an impact on U.S. lawyer regulation 
stakeholder conversations including those that are the subject of the 2020 
Symposium issue of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics. To return to the 
Article’s introduction and the “process” issue of how lawyer regulation change 
occurs, this Article argues that it is important for U.S. lawyer regulation stakeholders 
to be aware of the prevalence of global networks and to be prepared for global com-
parisons and perspectives when discussing domestic lawyer regulation issues.  
210. Henderson, supra note 3. 
211. Id. at 402 (emphasis in original). As Professor Henderson’s article explains, the factors that Rogers 
identified that affect the rate of adoption include: 1) the perceived attributes of innovation; 2) type of innovation 
decision (such as optional, where everyone decides for themselves, versus collective decision-making, versus 
authoritarian decision-making); 3) communication channels; 4) nature of the social system; and 5) efforts of 
change agents. Id. at 411 (including a table entitled “Rogers Rate Of Adoption Model,” which Henderson 
describes as “Adapted from Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations Fig. 6.1 (2003)”). See also id. at 428, Fig. 
7 (including a table entitled “Rogers Organizational Innovativeness Model” that summarizes the variables 
Roger identified that affect an organization’s innovativeness). 
212. See supra note 205 and accompanying text for a reference to “crossing the chasm.” 
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